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INTRODUCTION 
FRANKLIN Delano Roosevelt ("FDR") fueled his 1932 presi-dential campaign with populist attacks against the moneyed in-
terests, particularly investment bankers and the New York Stock 
Exchange. 1 In the wake of the stock market crash of October 1929 
and the depression which followed, the public sought someone to 
blame for the nation's economic misery. Anxious to oblige, the 
Senate pointed the finger at Wall Street's financiers in its 1932 Pe-
cora investigations.2 
The fight for social control over finance would be one of the 
great political battlegrounds of the New Deal and the eight men 
picked by Roosevelt for the Supreme Court were in the thick of it.3 
The two most prominent examples are Felix Frankfurter, a trusted 
advisor to Roosevelt, and William 0. Douglas, the third chairman 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Frankfurter's in-
volvement in the securities laws was pervasive: he helped "select 
the draftsmen of the SEC's three basic statutes, the FTC officials 
who enforced the Securities Act during its first year, most of the 
original SEC commissioners, and many of the Commission's top 
staff appointees."4 Moreover, he prodded Roosevelt to take on the 
public utility industry and brokered a key legislative compromise 
enabling the passage of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 ("PUHCA"), which Joel Seligman has characterized as "the 
most radical reform measure of the Roosevelt administration. "5 
1 Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 19-20 (3d ed. 2003). 
2 Id. at 1-2. The Pecora hearings take their name from Ferdinand Pecora, who led 
the Senate investigation. Pecora would later serve as one of the Security and Ex-
change Commission's first commissioners. 
3 Roosevelt named eight new Justices during his presidency and also elevated Stone 
to Chief Justice. Because James Byrnes resigned after serving only a short time on the 
Court, Roosevelt thus filled eight of the nine seats. Only Roberts (and Stone) carried 
over from the pre-New Deal Court to Truman's presidency. 
•Seligman, supra note 1, at 57-58. 
i Id. at 122; see also Morris L. Porer, A Postscript to the Administration of the Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act: The Hydro-Electric System Case, 45 Va. L. Rev. 
1007, 1007--08 (1959) ("Probably the most dynamic piece of New Deal legislation, 
[PUHCA) was revolutionary in that it required not only the immediate eradication of 
specific and now all too familiar abuses, but also in that it provided for the minute su-
pervision of actions and programs then conceived as being safely reposed in manage-
ment. This statute aimed not only at the remedial, but, shooting at the escaping pre-
sent, had also as its target a better economic future." (footnote omitted)). 
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The future Justice with the greatest hands-on experience with the 
securities laws was William 0. Douglas. His research on the bank-
ruptcy reorganization process led to the enactment of the Chandler 
Act, which gave the SEC a critical role in the reorganization of in-
solvent public companies. As SEC Chairman, he took on the New 
York Stock Exchange, thereby making himself a national political 
figure.6 Douglas also began the breakup of the public utility hold-
ing companies under PUHCA. But those two Justices do not begin 
to exhaust the securities law experience of those who would be 
called upon to interpret these acts. In the Senate, future Justices 
Hugo Black and James Byrnes played critical roles in the legisla-
tive process leading to the enactment of the securities laws. In a 
smaller way, Wiley Rutledge joined in the public debate. Future 
Justices Robert Jackson and Stanley Reed were key players in de-
fending those laws against constitutional challenge in the courts; 
Frank Murphy's tenure as Attorney General thrust him into the 
litigation as well. 
In this Article, we explore the role of the New Deal Justices in 
enacting, defending, and interpreting the federal securities laws.' 
Although we canvass most of the Court's securities law decisions 
from 1935 to 1955, we focus in particular on PUHCA, an act now 
lost to history for securities practitioners and scholars.8 At the time 
of the New Deal, PUHCA was the key point of engagement for de-
fining the judicial view toward New Deal securities legislation. 
Taming the power of Wall Street required not just the concurrence 
of the legislative branch, but also the Supreme Court, a body that 
the Roosevelt Administration generally considered hostile to its 
economic planning initiatives. PUHCA was enacted at a time when 
the constitutional scope of federal power was still very much in 
doubt. The statute was a major federal intervention into the free 
•Seligman characterizes Douglas's chairmanship as "the most accomplished in the 
SEC's history." Seligman, supra note l, at 157. 
7 For this project, we examined the papers of each of the eight New Deal Justices in 
the Library of Congress and in various other libraries where they are deposited. The 
records relied upon are all publicly available. 
8 PUHCA was repealed in 2005. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 
594. We end our analysis when the last of the PUHCA reorganizations had worked 
their way up to the Court in the mid-1950s. Among the New Deal Justices, Justice 
Frankfurter would continue to serve into the 1960s and Justices Black and Douglas 
into the 1970s. We leave those periods for future work. 
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play of capitalist forces, requiring the dismantling of the utility 
holding companies. Thus, it stood in contrast to the other federal 
securities laws, which focused primarily on disclosure. At the time, 
PUHCA was much more important than the Exchange Act in 
regulating corporate finance, and more dramatic even than the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of recent vintage.9 PUHCA "gave the SEC 
power to refashion the structure and the business practices of an 
entire industry. Except in wartime, the federal government never 
before had assumed such total control over any industry."10 
PUHCA provided the majority of securities cases in the Supreme 
Court over the first twenty years after the enactment of the securi-
ties laws,11 but PUHCA's significance to the Court's docket was not 
merely quantitative. The Court's decisions on PUHCA were the 
most closely followed securities cases in the popular press, as they 
pitted the giant utility holding companies against the government 
in a battle for survival. 
The Supreme Court's ten-year journey toward affirming that 
PUHCA was within the scope of Congress' commerce power re-
flects the shift in the Court's balance of power toward Roosevelt's 
appointees. The New Deal Justices shared a belief in the promise 
of the administrative state to tame private interest; they blamed the 
excesses of private ordering for the Great Depression. By 1947, the 
9 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7201-66 (2006)). 
10 Seligman, supra note 1, at 131. 
"PUHCA accounted for thirteen cases between 1935 and 1955, as compared to ten 
for all other securities law issues combined. The PUHCA cases were: SEC v. Drexel 
& Co., 348 U.S. 341 (1955); Gen. Protective Comm. for Holders of Options Warrants 
of United Corp. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 521 (1954); Niagara Hudson Power Co. v. Leventritt, 
340 U.S. 336 (1951); SEC v. Cent.-lll. Sec. Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949); In re Elec. Power 
& Light Corp., 337 U.S. 903 (1948); Eng'rs Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 332 U.S. 788 (1947); 
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery Corp. 11), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Am. Power & Light 
Co. v. SEC (Am. Power & Light Co. JI), 329 U.S. 90 (1946); N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 
U.S. 686 (1946); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945); Otis & Co. v. 
SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1945); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Landis v. N. Am. 
Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). 
The ten non-PUHCA cases were: Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); SEC v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 
U.S. 344 (1943); Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941); A. C. Frost & Co. v. 
Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38 (1941); Deckert v. Independence Shares 
Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 
(1940); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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New Deal Court had established the power that the federal gov-
ernment now wields over corporate and securities regulation. Of 
equal import, the Court's decisions in PUHCA cases established a 
pattern of expansive interpretations of the securities laws; govern-
ment regulation and the SEC enjoyed a remarkable string of victo-
ries beginning in 1940, a winning streak that would last, with minor 
exceptions, until 1973.12 
PUHCA also provided the key vehicle for working out the judi-
cial response to the inherent tension between administrative dis-
cretion and judicial review. Roosevelt's appointees to the Court all 
believed government power was needed to tame the excesses of 
business, but they split over the respective roles of courts and the 
SEC in implementing this vision. Would the new administrative 
state, built with the assistance of the future New Deal Justices, af-
ford discretion to the experts, or would the SEC be bound by legal 
rules defined by judges? 
Frankfurter's answer to this question put him in the minority on 
the New Deal Court. Although Frankfurter was a long time be-
liever in governance by experts,13 as a Justice he regularly sought to 
constrain the SEC with rules and even common law understandings 
of particular words. The Court majority, however, was willing to 
defer broadly to the expert agency. Douglas's views on this ques-
12 The Supreme Court gave an expansive view of the securities law and supported 
the SEC's position in all but a few of the securities decisions that came before the 
court in the first four decades after the passage of the securities act. See E. Thomas 
Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanish-
ing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 Emory L.J. 1571, 1579-86 (2004) (de-
scribing the Supreme Court's expansive holding in all but a handful of securities cases 
until 1973). Lewis F. Powell played the key role in reversing this trend. See A.C. 
Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Secu-
rities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841 (2003). 
13 After FDR's election as Governor, Frankfurter 
sent F.D.R. a copy of the Dodge Lectures he had delivered at the Yale Law 
School, The Public and Its Government, which emphasized many key ideas of 
his mature political philosophy-the indispensability of the administrative 
process in the management of contemporary economic life; the importance of 
nurturing federalism and seeking state or regional solutions to social problems 
that were not overwhelmingly national in scope; the adaptability of the Consti-
tution to the resolution of these conflicts; and the crucial role that could be 
played in modern government by trained experts recruited from the nation's 
universities and professional schools. 
Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years 200 (1982). 
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tion closely aligned him with the majority of his colleagues, but his 
influence was no greater than Frankfurter's in the field of securities 
law. The former SEC chairman's uncharacteristically cautious pat-
tern of recusing himself in cases involving the agency meant that he 
rarely participated in securities cases. Somewhat unexpectedly, the 
two Justices whose pre-Court experience might have suggested 
they would most dramatically influence the Supreme Court's secu-
rities jurisprudence ended up with surprisingly little effect on the 
development of that doctrine. 
We proceed as follows. Part I describes the role of the future 
New Deal Justices in helping to enact the federal securities laws. 
Part II sets forth the constitutional challenges that followed and 
the role played by Roosevelt's appointees, first in defending the se-
curities laws and subsequently upholding them as members of the 
Court. Part III shows the tension that arose among the New Deal 
Justices over the conflict between judicial review and the rule of 
experts. Part IV explores Roosevelt's success in establishing a 
Court majority that gave a reliably warm reception to the SEC. We 
also offer some speculations on Frankfurter and Douglas's lack of 
influence as Justices in the field of securities law. We sum up in a 
brief Conclusion. 
I. SOCIAL CONTROL OVER FINANCE 
A. The Securities Laws of the New Deal 
The fight for social control over finance was one of the great po-
litical battlegrounds of the New Deal. Most of FDR's future Su-
preme Court nominees would distinguish themselves in the com-
bat. The years from 1933 to 1935 saw annual fights to enact the 
three laws that established the foundation of federal securities leg-
islation; four more laws were enacted during Roosevelt's second 
term: 
• The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") brought the 
federal government into the regulation of the public of-
fering of securities, curbing the investment bankers' prior 
domination of that process. The law required corporate 
issuers to make full disclosure when selling securities in 
an effort to curb the speculative excesses of the 1920s. 
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• The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act') 
targeted the New York Stock Exchange, regulating trad-
ing practices and requiring disclosure of operations and 
results by companies listing on exchanges. The Exchange 
Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to administer the securities laws. 
• The most controversial of the three securities laws from 
FDR's first term, however, was the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935, which targeted the holding com-
panies that owned most of the public utilities in the 
United States at the time. PUHCA went well beyond dis-
closure that characterized the two earlier securities stat-
utes and permitted the SEC to break up the pyramid 
structure of those holding companies and shape the cor-
porate governance and capital structures of the reorgan-
ized firms. PUHCA's sweeping reforms would trigger a 
decade-long war in the courts, as the giant utilities re-
sisted the efforts of the SEC to dismantle them. 
• During FDR's second term, the Chandler Act rewrote 
the bankruptcy law to give the SEC a similar role in cor-
porate reorganizations.14 
We do not provide a comprehensive account of the legislative his-
tory behind these statutes, but instead highlight the role of the fu-
ture Justices in the political fight to pass these laws.15 The future 
Justice closest to the center of the conflict was Felix Frankfurter. 
While serving as a Harvard professor, he had ingratiated himself to 
Roosevelt as a legal and economic advisor during Roosevelt's ten-
ure as governor of New York. Frankfurter and the many proteges 
he sent to Washington to man the Roosevelt administration were 
disciples of Louis Brandeis's crusade against "bigness," that is, eco-
nomic concentration.16 Frankfurter and his fellow Brandeisians 
14 The other three statutes of the second term-the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 
Stat. 1149; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847; and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789-completed the menu of New Deal securities leg-
islation, extending government regulation to bond covenants, mutual funds, and in-
vestment advisers. These statutes produced no Supreme Court cases during our pe-
riod of study. 
1
' For the comprehensive account, see Seligman, supra note 1. 
16 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 148 (1963) 
("Brandeis' ideas made their way in Washington under the aegis of his chief disciple, 
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viewed big business as an enemy to be defeated. 11 Imposing gov-
ernment control over the world of finance was not merely a matter 
of sound policy, but the key front in the battle to save capitalism 
from the evil of the capitalists. 18 Frankfurter wrote to Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone in early 1933: "I wish I had a tithe of 
Macauley's power and of Bagehot's financial capacity. I would 
write a series of studies entitled 'Enemies of Capitalism,' and in-
stead of dealing with Marx, Lenin & Co., I should analyze the 
Charles W. Mitchells, the Samuel lnsulls & Co .... "19 Frankfurter 
Felix Frankfurter, and through the young men Frankfurter had sent down to be law 
clerks to the Justice or to staff New Deal agencies."). Brandeis's influence was not 
limited to his writings before becoming a Justice; he regularly sent messages on policy 
to Roosevelt, using Frankfurter as his emissary. Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Law-
yers 20 (1982). Brandeis's use of Frankfurter for this task was a long-standing prac-
tice. See David W. Levy & Bruce Allen Murphy, Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a 
Conservative Time: The Joint Reform Efforts of Justice Brandeis and Professor 
Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1252, 1257, 1279 (1980). 
17 H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 104 (1981) ("The ideological core 
of Brandeisian liberalism was its emphasis on smallness. As many of the advisors of 
Roosevelt's first New Deal-Tugwell, Berle, Moley-struggled to create a planned 
and centralized economy, the Brandeisians sought to restore the simple and decen-
tralized market economy of the nineteenth century. Their key program was trust bust-
ing-breaking up the large banks, the large corporations, the large utility companies. 
To the first New Dealers, business was to be a partner; to the Brandeisians, business 
was the enemy."). 
18 Frankfurter wrote Roosevelt that "the real tr0uble with capitalism is the capital-
ists." Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt (May 18, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library 
of Congress, Reel 60). 
Frankfurter had a similarly dim view of the lawyers and accountants who served the 
capitalists. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to James 
M. Landis, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Feb. 8, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frank-
furter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 70) ("I have Jong had strong suspicions 
that these fancy accounting firms occupy a role towards financial and business im-
moralities comparable to that of the eminent law firms."). 
19 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone (undated) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law 
School Library, Part 3, Reel 3). Frankfurter had a sympathetic audience in Stone, who 
responded: "Perhaps the most astonishing manifestation of our times is the blindness 
of those who have the big stake in our present system to its evils. It is the story of the 
Bourbons over again." Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Feb. 17, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 3, Reel 3). Another sympathetic ear on the 
Court was Louis Brandeis, who was "quiet[Iy] advising [the Roosevelt administration] 
from the sidelines." Letter from Raymond Moley to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, 
Harvard Law Sch. (Oct. 31, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Li-
brary of Congress, Reel 51). 
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had no doubt that stringent regulation was needed. As he wrote af-
ter the Securities Act became law: 
During the height of the greatest speculative carnival in the 
world's history, billions of new securities were floated, of which a 
large part had no relation to the country's need and which inevi-
tably became worthless; worthless not merely for millions who 
had sought speculative gains, but for those other millions who 
sought to conserve the savings of a lifetime. By all the subtle and 
mesmerizing arts of modern salesmanship, the sellers of securi-
ties had so extended the field of security buyers that 55 per cent 
of all savings ... went into publicly marketed securities. The re-
sulting losses cut from under the basic supports of a considerable 
portion of the population, and especially of those helplessly de-
pendent on income from savings. The enormous, easy profits 
from their distribution stimulated the creation and sale of billions 
in securities, which have burdened industry and wasted or misdi-
rected the capital resources of the nation.20 
B. The Securities Act 
Roosevelt agreed with Frankfurter that the speculative frenzy of 
the 1920s had been a disaster for investors and business alike. 
Stock exchange and securities legislation was on Roosevelt's early 
list of "must" legislation, and Sam Untermyer had been drafted to 
work on a bill as early as December 1932.21 The transition to the 
new administration was hectic, and two securities bills ended up 
being drafted22 with the result that the bill regulating securities of-
ferings that was sent to Congress was deemed a "hopeless mess."23 
At this point, Ray Moley, one of Roosevelt's key advisors, 
brought Frankfurter in to sort things out.24 Frankfurter had recently 
turned down Roosevelt's offer to become Solicitor General; he 
thought he would be more useful to Roosevelt if he maintained the 
20 Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 53, 54. 
ii Raymond Moley, After Seven Years 176 (1939). 
22 See id. at 177-78. PUHCA is another example of FDR using competing drafts of 
securities legislation. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
23 Moley, supra note 21, at 179. 
24 Id. 
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independence afforded him as a law professor.25 Frankfurter 
viewed the law schools as centers for an empirical, scientific ap-
proach to the development of social reform legislation;26 here was 
an opportunity to put that theory into action and at the same time 
make himself useful to Roosevelt.21 Frankfurter's success in the ef-
fort cemented his role in the administration; according to Moley, 
Frankfurter's involvement in the drafting of the Securities Act 
"was to make inevitable Felix's appointment to the Supreme 
Court."28 
Frankfurter quickly made his way to Washington, enlisting his 
Harvard colleague, Jim Landis, and two former students, Ben 
Cohen and Tommy Corcoran, in the effort.29 Frankfurter met with 
25 Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 15, 
1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 60); 
Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (Mar. 14, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 60). 
26 Hirsch, supra note 17, at 41. 
27 Felix Frankfurter, Diary (May 8, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collec-
tion, Library of Congress) ("I said that having refused the request of the President for 
my services as Solicitor General, I could not possibly decline the President's request, 
these days, to do ad hoc jobs."). 
28 Moley, supra note 21, at 180. 
29 Felix Frankfurter, Diary (May 8, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collec-
tion, Library of Congress). Landis, Cohen, and Corcoran would eventually become 
quite influential New Deal figures in their own right, but they were all Frankfurter's 
proteges at that time. Frankfurter picked clerks for Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone; 
Landis had clerked for Brandeis, and Corcoran for Holmes, on Frankfurter's recom- . 
mendation. Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 36 (1975). Cohen 
and Corcoran remained squarely within Frankfurter's sphere of influence after they 
became part of the New Deal. As Joseph Rauh put it, "When Felix came to Washing-
ton, I was working for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran. They were pretty important 
guys, but when Felix walked in the door there wasn't any question who was boss." Jo-
seph L. Rauh, Jr., Clerks of the Court on the Justices, in The Making of the New 
Deal: The Insiders Speak 55, 63 (Katie Louchheim ed., 1983). On Cohen and Cor-
coran's influence, see The Janizariat, Time, Sept. 12, 1938, at 22, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,760147,00.html. Frankfurter's in-
fluence drew him the enmity of the Old Guard. See The Forgotten Memoir of John 
Knox 70 (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002) (quoting Justice 
McReynolds: "I also hope that you did not come under the influence of Frankfurter 
when you were in law school. ... He is certainly one man not to be trusted! Even 
though he is dangerous to the welfare of this country, he evidently has a powerful in-
fluence at the White House."); id. at 114 (quoting Justice McReynolds: "Statutes [es-
tablishing the New Deal] carelessly drawn by young men just out of the Harvard Law 
School! Frankfurter's proteges, too, I suppose!") 
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Moley and Sam Rayburn, chairman of the relevant House sub-
committee, on a Friday; by Monday, Landis and Cohen, under 
Frankfurter's supervision, had come up with a draft for the securi-
ties legislation.3° Frankfurter supplied Rayburn with a draft of the 
report for the bill,31 as well as a response to the objections made by 
the Investment Bankers Association32 that captures his attitude to-
ward the bankers: "The Investment Bankers Association and all 
their tribe ... really think it is terrible that the securities business 
should be made a conservative business rather than a refined and 
intricate form of fleecing."33 At the same time, however, a compet-
ing bill was proceeding through the Senate. Frankfurter worked 
diligently to lobby for Landis's and Cohen's version34 and to stave 
off efforts to reconcile the two bills, arguing that reconciliation 
"would involve interminable delay and jeopardize passage because 
powerful and increasing financial lobbies against all regulation will 
exploit differences to defeat enactment."35 After a good deal of leg-
islative maneuvering, the Senate bill was killed in conference with 
the help of Senator James Byrnes, whom Roosevelt would later 
30 Felix Frankfurter, Diary (May 8, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collec-
tion, Library of Congress). 
31 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Sam Rayburn, 
U.S. Rep. (Apr. 24, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 115). 
32 Memorandum Commenting Upon a Memorandum Prepared By Counsel For the 
Investment Bankers' Association in re H.R. 5480 (undated) (on file with the Felix 
Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 84). 
33 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Raymond Moley 
(May 10, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 51). 
34 See Telegram from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Raymond 
Moley (Apr. 27, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Con-
gress, Reel 115); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to 
Raymond Moley (Apr. 28, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Li-
brary of Congress, Reel 115); Telegram from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch., to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Apr. 14, 1933) (on file with the Felix 
Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 115). On Landis's role as SEC 
Commissioner, Chairman, and administrative law theorist, see Thomas K. McCraw, 
Prophets of Regulation 153-209 (1984). 
35 See Telegram from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 8, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, 
Library of Congress, Reel 115). 
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appoint to the Court.36 Landis's and Cohen's draft, with amend-
ments here and there, was adopted as the Securities Act of 1933.37 
While the Securities Act was working its way through Congress, 
Yale law professor William 0. Douglas initially served as a cheer-
leader for the effort to bring in experts to tame the power of high 
finance. In a letter to the New York Times, Douglas urged that the 
investor 
needs protection which bankers have not and will not give him. 
The reputable bankers are no exception. Even they have been 
known to cut corners and to be governed by the hysteria of bull 
markets .... 
There is a need for some agency to step in between the per-
sons who get the money and those who supply it and to fulfill the 
role of protector for the latter. ... The ideal of "rugged individu-
alism" when applied to investors has no longer any place in the 
program for American high finance.38 
After the 1933 Act was enacted, however, Douglas was less favor-
able, concluding that the disclosure alone would not prevent the 
recurrence of the scandals uncovered by Ferdinand Pecora's com-
mittee,39 dismissing it as "of secondary importance in a comprehen-
sive program of social control over finance."40 Privately, he was 
more critical: "I think the Securities Act is a rather laborious and 
untimely effort to turn back the clock and quite antithetical to 
36 Maley, supra note 21, at 182-83 (noting that Byrnes helped Senate Majority 
Leader Joe Robinson bury the Senate bill in conference in favor of the Frankfurter 
bill). Byrnes would later play a role in navigating the Exchange Act through confer-
ence. Seligman, supra note 1, at 98-99. 
37 For a firsthand account of the maneuvering, see James M. Landis, The Legislative 
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29 (1959). 
38 William 0. Douglas, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1933 (on file with 
the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 116). 
39 William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 
Yale L.J. 171, 171 (1933) ("There is nothing in the Act which would control the specu-
lative craze of the American public, or which would eliminate wholly unsound capital 
structures. There is nothing in the Act which would prevent a tyrannical management 
from playing wide and loose with scattered minorities, or which would prevent a new 
pyramiding of holding companies violative of the public interest and all canons of 
sound finance."). 
40 Id. 
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many of the other significant current developments."41 Douglas fa-
vored bolder reform: federal incorporation and federal control of 
corporate govemance.42 Douglas was anxious to involve himself in 
efforts that were brewing to draft legislation to achieve those 
goals.43 
In pursuing federal incorporation, Douglas was simply calling for 
additional liberal reforms. Yet his criticisms of the 1933 Act struck 
Frankfurter as echoing the reactionary drumbeat of the investment 
bankers and their corporate lawyers. Douglas worried that the Se-
curities Act would chill capital formation: 
The cumulative effects of the absolute liability of the issuer, the 
undefined liability of stockholders, the liability of directors irre-
spective of the nature of their appointments, the liability of un-
derwriters, and the increasing difficulty on the part of issuers to 
obtain that underwriting, make it more and more apparent that, 
whether rightly or wrongly, justifiably or otherwise, the Act will 
prevent a great amount of financing by many companies with 
well established businesses and will continue to deter refunding 
operations and reorganizations.44 
41 See Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to A.A. Berle, Jr., 
Professor, Columbia Law Sch. (Dec. 29, 1933) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress). 
42 See Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to Jerome N. 
Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Dec. 2, 1933) (on file with the Wil-
liam 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress) ("I am particularly intrigued with 
your proposal for federal incorporation, as I think that only by some such beginning 
can genuine progress towards protection of investors get under way."). 
43 See Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to A.A. Berle, Jr., 
Professor, Columbia Law Sch. (Jan. 3, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Col-
lection, Library of Congress) ("You can count on me to pull an oar on federal incor-
poration .... [P]erhaps we can begin to get at the really fundamental problem of the 
increment of power and profit inherent in our present form of organization .... "). 
44 Douglas & Bates, supra note 39, at 192 (footnotes omitted). Douglas conceded 
some virtue in the ambiguities in the Securities Act, as they "would give the enforcing 
agency a powerful weapon ... with which to control financial practices deemed inimi-
cal to the public interest." Id. at 211. His bottom line, however, was that the Act re-
quired amendment to correct its "ambiguities and inconsistencies" lest it "para-
lyz[ e] ... legitimate activity." William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, Some Effects 
of the Securities Act upon Investment Banking, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 283, 306 (1933). 
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Douglas's critique drew a sharp rebuke from Frankfurter.45 Frank-
furter confided to Landis that Douglas had fallen under the sway of 
the money people and their fellow travelers in the business 
schools.46 Frankfurter's main concern was that any criticism of the 
law would further the conspiracy that he perceived among invest-
ment bankers and their lawyers to gut the Act: 
I happen to know in some detail what some of the leading law 
firms have been up to in order to create a state of mind for 
amendments on the plea of recovery. You know as well as I do 
that the notion that the Securities Act has stopped capital issues 
is just rubbish.47 
In Frankfurter's view, Douglas was lending aid and comfort to the 
foes of the New Deal by calling for the law's amendment. "It is of 
course very generous of you, with everybody agin [sic] them at pre-
sent, for you to champion the cause of 'the Street' and persecuted 
houses like J.P.Morgan [sic] and Kuhn, Loeb."48 
Frankfurter also disagreed with some of Douglas's more ambi-
tious ideas for the social control of finance, such as federal incor-
poration and direct governmental control of securities issues. Here 
his Brandeisian distrust of "bigness" came through, this time di-
rected at the federal government: 
I am much more sceptical than you are, apparently, of the large 
schemes of which you speak for curbing corporate abuses .... I 
am not at all for federal incorporation .... Where do you men 
get your great confidence in the effectiveness of piling on every-
thing on the back of federal administration[?] I was a hot Hamil-
•s Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to James M. Landis, 
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 17, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 70) ("I wrote him a letter the other day, in a half-
saucy, half-severe strain .... "). 
46 Id. ("[E]ven Bill Douglas is trying to reflect too much the people in the big offices 
and the business schools, among whom he likes to appear as a sound and knowing fel-
low."). 
47 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to William 0. Doug-
las, Professor, Yale Law Sch. (Jan. 16, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Col-
lection, Library of Congress). 
48 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to William 0. Doug-
las, Professor, Yale Law Sch. (Feb. 5, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Col-
lection, Library of Congress). 
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tonian when I went to Washington in 1911, but years in the gov-
ernment service and all the rest of the years watching its opera-
tions intently have made me less jaunty about devices for running 
a whole continent from Washington.49 
Frankfurter instead favored graduated taxation rates to penalize 
"big corporations" which he believed would "prevent all sorts of 
nonsense that we never could touch through a federal incorpora-
tion act."5° Frankfurter was equally skeptical of federal government 
control of securities issues: 
It's awfully easy to write these nice laws for control. I think your 
lawyer-banker friends would be glad to write them for you, 
but ... when I think of the stuff that gets by even high-minded 
judges-well, I prefer to use the taxing power . . . to curb the 
mischief and abuses of corporate activities . 
. . . Tax 'em, my boy, tax 'em, and otherwise reduce the oppor-
tunities for bludgeoning that interrelation and concentration of 
money interests make possible.51 
49 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to William 0. Douglas (Jan. 16, 1934), supra note 
47. 
so Id. 
51 Id. Frankfurter had been pursuing a "tax on the bigness of corporations" since at 
least 1932. See Letter from Burton K. Wheeler, U.S. Sen., to Felix Frankfurter, Pro-
fessor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 30, 1932) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collec-
tion, Library of Congress, Reel 67); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch., to Burton K. Wheeler, U.S. Sen. (Apr. 4, 1932) (on file with the Felix 
Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 67). Roosevelt endorsed Frank-
furter's legislation in January 1935. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury 
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 16, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frank-
furter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 155). Senator Burton Wheeler introduced 
it into Congress shortly thereafter. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch., to Burton Wheeler, U.S. Sen. (Mar. 12, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frank-
furter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 67) ("I rejoice over your introduction of 
the tax on bigness .... "). 
Frankfurter also discouraged Roosevelt from pursuing federal incorporation. Letter 
from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt (Mar. 6, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Con-
gress, Reel 60) ("I notice also some talk of an Administration measure for federal in-
corporation .... Great difficulties are involved in such a measure, and I hope there 
won't be any urgency in pushing it. Of course many abuses have found shelter under 
our corporation laws. But the abuses that call for public protection and are essential 
to a healthy economic life can be dealt with by a number of specific improvements in 
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Douglas was most contrite in his response,52 but he did not yield 
ground on the need for federal incorporation53 and complete gov-
ernmental control over investment banking54-goals he would con-
tinue to pursue as SEC chairman.55 
Frankfurter's worry that the investment bankers and corporate 
lawyers were conspiring to undo the progress of the Securities Act 
was a recurring theme of his correspondence in late 1933 and early 
1934.56 At first he dismissed the notion of a "bankers strike" as 
mere "newspaper talk,"57 motivated by the newspapers' interest in 
"profitable but socially elicit financial advertising."58 He was dis-
missive of investment bankers' worries that their potential "liabil-
ity under the present law is more than fifty times our average 
profit, even though we may make no untrue or misleading state-
ment or leave out any material fact, merely because we may be un-
able to sustain the burden of proof that we have not made such er-
federal legislation, especially through the use of the taxing power, without prema-
turely raising the many problems that are involved in a federal incorporation law."). 
52 Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to Felix Frankfurter, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Feb. 19, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress) ("My heart would indeed 'bleed' if I thought I was 
inadvertently championing the cause of 'the Street."'). 
53 Id. ("On analysis it will be seen that federal incorporation is only one device. But 
it is a damn convenient one. Hooked up with the commerce and taxing powers it can 
be made a powerful weapon for social control."). 
54 Id. ("The Securities Act will be fully justified if it drives the government into the 
investment banking business."). 
55 Seligman, supra note 1, at 205-09 (discussing federal incorporation); Letter from 
William 0. Douglas, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, to Henry A. Wallace, Sec'y, 
Dep't of Agric. (Apr. 11, 1938) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Li-
brary of Congress) (advocating a system of government investment banking). 
56 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (July 6, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 60) ("[F]ray indeed is ahead in the administration of the Securities 
Act. There are still too many in 'the Street' who think what Joe Cotton used to call 
the 'green goods business'-when he passed on securities issues for his notable cli-
ents-will flourish as of old. It is hard for some folk to realize that new social and 
economic standards ever come into play."). 
57 See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Arthur 
Perry (Sept. 7, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Con-
gress, Reel 84). 
58 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Louis Howe (Sept. 
13, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 84). 
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rors. "59 Frankfurter believed that corporate lawyers were misrepre-
senting the effects of the law to their clients as part of a "concerted 
effort[] ... to chloroform the Securities Act,"60 and he lobbied 
Roosevelt to resist the effort.61 In Frankfurter's view, "no clarifica-
tion is needed and 'clarification' isn't what is wanted."62 Opposition 
to the law was "selfish and ignorant. "63 Despite Frankfurter's resis-
tance, however, the move to amend the Securities Act would 
gather steam when the administration began drafting a law to regu-
late the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").64 
59 Letter from Arthur Perry to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 
(Sept. 14, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 84). Frankfurter's response was a harbinger of the response to claims of exces-
sive securities regulation that we hear today: "The English seem to have done very 
well as the money market of the world despite their stringent controls. My patriotism 
is somewhat offended-and I speak as an Anglophile-that ethical and fiduciary 
standards which are legally enforced in England should be deemed too stringent for 
us. I refuse to believe it." Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., 
to Arthur Perry (Sept. 18, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library 
of Congress, Reel 84). 
60 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone (Sept. 28, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 64); see also Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law 
Sch., to George Brownell (Dec. 1, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, 
Library of Congress, Reel 69) ("The leading law firms of New York and Boston ... 
began a systematic campaign to undermine the essentials of the Act by attributing to 
it the congealing of capital investment. ... [T]here isn't a particle of doubt that law-
yers of responsibility and high standing infused clients with fears and worse than 
that-I know what I am talking about-actually discouraged clients, at times, from 
doing any financing for the present, so that the campaign against the Act, when Con-
gress next meets, should show that the Act had prevented financing."). 
61 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (Dec. 19, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 155); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to 
Henry Stimson {Dec. 19, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library 
of Congress, Reel 84). 
62 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to James M. Landis, 
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Jan. 10, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 70). 
63 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to James M. Landis, 
Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 30, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 45). 
64 Letter from James M. Landis, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Felix Frankfurter, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Dec. 13, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 70) ("As you know, the Securities Act has been 
opened pretty widely for discussion."). 
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C. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The NYSE was the second bete noire of the Pecora hearings and 
moved to the center of the legislative stage in the second year of 
the New Deal. The NYSE claimed to be self-regulated, but at least 
some observers felt that self-regulation lacked teeth.65 Frankfurter 
heartily agreed that the Exchange was "long overdue" for govern-
mental regulation, telling Roosevelt: "There has been more than 
ample time for self-regulation, and self-regulation they have shown 
is not in them. "66 
Frankfurter's role here was more indirect than it had been with 
the Securities Act because he was at Oxford for the year. Given the 
era's limited means of communication and transportation, his lob-
bying was confined to telegrams and letters. On board a ship to 
England, he wrote Roosevelt urging him to fight for legislation 
controlling the NYSE.67 
65 As the Securities Act was working its way through Congress, Stone wrote to 
Frankfurter: 
Of course, the Stock Exchange should require precise information as to the to-
tal distribution made to officers and directors. The fact that it has never done so 
shows how little it performs what should be its real function to protect ade-
quately those who deal in securities sold under its auspices. Many years ago, af-
ter I had unearthed a series of shockingly fraudulent performances by members 
of the Exchange, which should have been known to its Governors, I told the lat-
ter that the survival of the Exchange would depend primarily on their own will-
ingness to take proper measures to protect adequately the interest of those who 
availed of its facilities. 
Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law 
Sch. (May 15, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Con-
gress, Reel 64). 
66 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (Feb. 14, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 155). 
67 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (Oct. 1, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 155). Frankfurter quoted at length from a letter that he had received 
from Stone, which Frankfurter considered particularly apt, as Stone was "an old-line 
Republican, a member of Sullivan & Cromwell before he became Coolidge's Attor-
ney General": 
Id. 
The new Securities Act promises well and undoubtedly will prevent some of the 
fraudulent schemes which have been common in the past, especially in market-
ing bonds. There is another like evil that must ultimately be reached, and that is 
the creation of boom markets for stocks through wash sales on the Exchange. 
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Despite his distance from events on the ground, Frankfurter's in-
fluence was leveraged by the central role that Cohen and Corcoran 
played in drafting the law. Cohen revised the first version of the 
legislation under the influence of Pecora; the result was a draco-
nian bill that would have fundamentally changed the operation of 
the NYSE.68 The president of the NYSE, Richard Whitney, galva-
nized the opposition of the brokerage community, as well as the 
regional exchanges, which would have been crippled by the law as 
drafted.69 Corcoran, as the administration's point man in lobbying 
for the bill, fought tenaciously to preserve it.70 Landis, however, 
was somewhat more pragmatic than Frankfurter, and he recog-
nized that the legislation would need to be modified to be en-
acted.11 In an effort to preserve the core of the Securities Act, 
Landis took charge of the amendments to that legislation, a move 
that appears to have assuaged Frankfurter's concerns.12 
The fate of the stock exchange bill, however, was still in doubt. 
For Frankfurter, the exchange bill was "a test of power"73 and the 
campaign against it was tinged with anti-Semitism.74 Cohen and 
68 Seligman, supra note 1, at 85-87. 
69 Id. at 89-93. 
10 Letter from Ben Cohen to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (May 
11, [1934]) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 
101i. 
1 Letter from James M. Landis, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Felix Frankfurter, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 6, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collec-
tion, Library of Congress, Reel 70) ("The Stock Exchange Bill is receiving a terrific 
battering. All the corporate wealth of this country has gone into the attack and car-
ried it all the way up to the White House. I think F.D. will stand very firm on its es-
sentials, however."). 
72 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to James M. Landis, 
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 17, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 70) ("What you tell me as to the likely direction of 
amendments to the Securities Act is, of course, extremely interesting and sounds like 
sense."). 
73 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Raymond Moley 
(Apr. 24, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 71). 
74 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Tom Corcoran 
(May 7, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 70) ("[T]he talk against the Jews in the government comes from the powerful 
financial and business interests, who have given battle and will continue to give battle 
to the Administration on things like the Seucrites [sic] Act and stock exchange legisla-
tion. It's Wall Street that is using the Jewish stick precisely as it has used and will use 
any other stick .... "). 
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Corcoran, drafted by Moley to revise the bill, "were in constant, 
almost daily, touch with Frankfurter. His function, so far as they 
were concerned, had come to be more inspirational than anything 
else. Felix was a patriarchal sorcerer to their apprentice, forever 
renewing their zeal for reform and their pride in fine workman-
ship."75 Corcoran kept Frankfurter informed of the bill's progress 
through a barrage of telegrams; Frankfurter sent a few telegrams of 
his own to key players in the fight. 76 When the exchange bill was 
eventually enacted, Frankfurter was effusive in his praise of Cohen 
and Corcoran: 
It was an extraordinary fight, and considering the forces and re-
sources against you, was an extraordinary achievement of a very 
small handful of men for decency and for honor and for the sal-
vage of those very institutions for which the blind men of Wall 
Street profess to speak but which in their greed, had they a free 
hand, they would be speedily destroying. You and Ben in par-
ticular have shown knowledge and pertinacity and devotion and 
good humor and good sense .... It makes me very proud indeed 
of your friendships.77 
While Frankfurter exulted in the triumph of good versus evil, 
taking almost paternal pleasure in the role that his proteges played 
in the fight, Douglas sensed opportunity. Early discussion of the 
proposed legislation indicated that either a new commission would 
be created to enforce its provisions or that the Federal Trade 
Commission, already tasked with administering the Securities Act, 
would be expanded to handle the new work.78 Douglas's close 
friend, Richard Smith, a public utility lawyer in New York, took 
the lead in lobbying for a seat on Douglas's behalf.19 Now that he 
was pursuing a job as a regulator, Douglas downplayed his earlier 
75 Moley, supra note 21, at 285. 
76 See, e.g., Telegram from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to John 
Dickinson, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Treasury (Mar. 4, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frank-
furter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 70). 
n Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Tom Corcoran 
(May 7, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 70). 
78 Seligman, supra note 1, at 84. 
79 See Letter from Richard Smith to Francis T. Maloney, U.S. Rep. (Mar. 23, 1934) 
(on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress). 
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criticisms of the Securities Act; the main thrust of his writing on the 
topic, he said, was that "it is necessary to have a very powerful 
commission fully equipped with a rather wide range of discretion 
to handle the job. The matter simply cannot be reduced to a 
code."80 Unfortunately for Douglas, his writings could not be ex-
plained away so easily. The word from Washington was that 
"Landis particularly is very resentful toward you, because of your 
writings on the Securities Act. "81 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the 
rebuke he had received from Frankfurter, Douglas did not ask the 
Harvard professor to lobby on his behal:f82 despite Frankfurter's 
well-known influence in personnel matters in the Roosevelt ad-
ministration.83 In the end, Douglas was passed over for a spot on 
the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission.84 
80 Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to Richard Smith 
(Apr. 9, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress). 
8 Letter from Richard Smith to William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch. (May 
26, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress). This 
view was evidently shared by others. See Letter from Richard Smith to William 0. 
Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch. (June 13, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Doug-
las Collection, Library of Congress) ("I received a letter from Maloney in which he 
stated that he was running into opposition to you among the crowd who have re-
sented your Articles."). 
82 Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to Richard Smith 
(June 12, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress). 
83 Frankfurter denied exercising such influence, despite the overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to 
Drew Pearson (May 17, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library 
of Congress, Reel 53). 
84 Ben Cohen, who clearly had earned a spot on the Commission through his draft-
ing efforts, was also passed over despite Tom Corcoran's lobbying efforts on Cohen's 
behalf. According to Corcoran, Roosevelt was afraid to put Cohen on the newly cre-
ated SEC for fear that it would provoke anti-Semitism. Telegraph from Centurion 
[Tom Corcoran] to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (May 30, 1934) 
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 70). The next 
year, however, Frankfurter recommended that Roosevelt not appoint Cohen to the 
SEC because Cohen was too essential to Roosevelt's legislative efforts. See Memo-
randum for the President from Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 21, 1935) (on file with the 
Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 155). Cohen also lost out on 
the General Counsel position at the new agency when the SEC's first chairman, Joe 
Kennedy, picked John Bums instead. (This scarcely reduced Frankfurter's influence; 
Bums was a Harvard Law graduate, and he would soon be filling the SEC's ranks 
with candidates recommended by Frankfurter.) Telegram from John J. Bums, Gen. 
Counsel, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (May 
10, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 84). 
Bums was also soliciting Frankfurter's views on the interpretation of the Exchange 
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Roosevelt pushed businessman Joseph P. Kennedy for chairman 
over the more obvious candidate, Landis, as part of the "truce of 
God" that the administration was seeking with the business com-
munity after the bitter fight over the Exchange Act.85 Roosevelt's 
rapprochement with the business community was to be short-lived. 
Having vanquished the investment bankers and the New York 
Stock Exchange, FDR's next target was the utility companies. 
D. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
When Frankfurter returned to the United States in the summer 
of 1934, he urged Roosevelt to face the "irrepressible conflict" with 
big business.86 The Exchange Act amendments relaxing the Securi-
ties Act's liability provisions had produced "[ o ]nly a trickling little 
stream of private corporation finance," leading Joe Kennedy to be-
rate the investment industry for its timidity.87 If the capitalists were 
not willing to do their part to foster economic recovery, why should 
the administration placate business by holding back from further 
reforms? Frankfurter 
insisted that the attempt at business-government co-operation 
had failed, and urged Roosevelt to declare war on business. Once 
the President understood that business was the enemy, he would 
be free to undertake the Brandeisian program to cut the giants 
down to size: by dwarfing the power of holding companies, by 
Act. Letter from John J. Burns, Gen. Counsel, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, to Felix Frank-
furter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Aug. 8, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter 
Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 115). 
85 Letter from Tom Corcoran to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 
(May 11, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 70) ("If Ray [Maley] is any barometer of what's going on in the White House 
mind, the plan of battle is to avoid any further attempt at reforms that might bring 
down more criticism during the present Congress, arrange a 'truce of God', reorgan-
ize the machinery down here to help along business recovery this summer, and in 
every other way postpone all other considerations to the necessarily primary objective 
of winning the Congressional elections."). 
86 Parrish, supra note 13, at 244. 
87 Joseph P. Kennedy, Speech to the American Arbitration Association 4 (Mar. 19, 
1935) (transcript on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress; 
Securities Act Release No. 317, Mar. 19, 1935). 
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launching antitrust suits, and by taxing large corporations more 
stiffly than small business.88 
Although investment banking and the NYSE had been the pri-
mary targets of the Pecora hearings, the collapse of the Insull pub-
lic utility holding company was the Enron of its day.89 The demise 
of the Insull empire cemented the public utility holding company 
structure's reputation for abuse.90 Wiley Rutledge, then dean of the 
Washington University School of Law and a teacher of corporate 
law, agreed with Douglas on the need for federal incorporation, 
and he also shared the aversion to bigness held by Frankfurter and 
the other Brandeisians.91 Rutledge had no experience or education 
in business or economics, but apparently his "brief law practice in-
cluded work for a public utility that caused him to question 'the 
holding company set-up. "'92 Rutledge made the case against big-
ness and the abuses that it facilitated in the holding company struc-
ture.93 He argued that the "devices of share dispersion, non-voting 
stock, the voting trust, etc .... multipl[y] the power to concentrate 
control almost in geometric progression. "94 Worse yet, the intricate 
interconnections within the holding company empires frustrated 
~ffective regulation: 
The maze of "contracts" and of accounts is so intricate that no 
outsider (and probably few "insiders") can determine real costs 
or profits. Rate-making becomes a farce, and the balance sheet 
88 Leuchtenburg, supra note 16, at 150. 
89 See David Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate 
America and Where They Came From 8, 80-89 (2005) (discussing Insull); Richard D. 
Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation 
After the Rise And Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 Energy L.J. 35, 36 (2005). 
90 Recent work by Paul Mahoney casts doubt on whether that reputation was war-
ranted. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Public Utility Pyramids 4 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/contracteconomics/confer-
ences/laweconomicsS08/Mahoney%20paper.pdf). 
91 John M. Ferren, Salt of the Earth, Conscience of the Court: The Story of Justice 
Wiley Rutledge 93 (2004) (noting that Rutledge favored the Brandeisian notion that 
the "growth of corporate enterprise has been drying up individual independence and 
initiative, drying up the life of the big town and the small town, and the hamlet. We 
are becoming a nation of hired men, hired by great aggregations of capital"). 
92 Id. at 89. 
93 Wiley B. Rutledge, Editorial, The Future of the Interstate Power Holding Com-
pany, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 5, 1935, at Editorial Section 1. 
94 Id. 
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of the system a puzzle worse than Chinese. The corporate family 
is the only ones [sic) known which can keep alive nine genera-
. l ~ hons contemporaneous y. 
Disclosure was not enough to correct these abuses; the federal 
government needed to control corporate governance as well. 
Frankfurter pushed FDR to make the holding company legisla-
tion a key component of the "second hundred days" legislative ini-
tiative in 1935.% Frankfurter had an active interest in public utili-
ties, having taught a course on the subject from his earliest days at 
Harvard.97 With his usual impatience, he had been pushing Roose-
velt to introduce legislation to control public utilities since even be-
fore Roosevelt's inauguration.98 Frankfurter's persistence was re-
warded on January 4, 1935, when Roosevelt called for the 
"abolition of the evil of holding companies" in his State of the Un-
ion address to Congress.99 Frankfurter was delighted; holding com-
panies, he urged, "really have no ultimate economic and social jus-
tivication [sic]. That the national interest requires their elimination 
I have no doubt . . . . [D ]rastic regulation and taxation are indis-
pensable, both in themselves and also for insurance against the 
possibility of alleviating legislation by a future Congress."100 Frank-
95 Id. 
96 Hirsch, supra note 17, at 116 ("The result of Frankfurter's proddings and Roose-
velt's tum of mind was the second hundred days, during which the administration 
pushed for five major pieces of legislation: the social securities bill, the Wagner labor 
bill, a banking bill, a holding companies measure, and a tax plan."). 
97 See Felix Frankfurter, Lecture to Pub. Utils. Course (Sept. 28, 1914) (on file with 
the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 3, Reel 21) (pre-
dicting that "in the immediate decades ahead, during your time and mine, there will 
be a continued extension of governmental activity and governmental supervision of 
business"). 
98 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Ray Moley (Feb. 
28, 1933) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 51) 
("This time I am troubling you about legislation regarding the reorganization and ex-
tension of federal public utility control. This is a subject on which F.D.R. spoke to me 
when I saw him last, and as to which he desires, I am sure, early action."). 
99 Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: 1935-1936, The Poli-
tics of Upheaval 305 (1960). 
'
00 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 24, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library 
of Congress, Reel 155). Frankfurter laid the blame for the evils of the industry with 
the investment bankers. Felix Frankfurter, The Public & Its Government 109-10 
(1930) (criticizing role of bankers in creating elaborate holding company structures 
that put utilities beyond the effective reach of regulation). 
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furter (and now Roosevelt) saw the opportunity for the elimination 
of holding companies; it needed to be seized, and seized quickly, 
lest future administrations succumb to lobbying pressure from the 
utility industry. 
There was disagreement within the administration, however, on 
the means to achieve this end. Ben Cohen drafted one bill, under 
the direction of Robert Healy (first an FTC commissioner and sub-
sequently an initial SEC commissioner), who had directed an ex-
haustive study of public utility companies by the FTC.101 As Cohen 
described it in a letter to Healy: 
[T]he bill does not outlaw the holding company but regulates and 
restricts the use of the holding company form and provides a 
mechanism through which, over a period of time, existing hold-
ing company structures may be simplified, and their field limited 
to a sphere where their economic advantages may be demonstra-
ble.102 
A Treasury Department team-under the direction of future 
Justice Robert H. Jackson and Herman Oliphant-favored almost 
immediate abolition through imposition of a stiff tax on dividends 
paid by operating companies to the holding companies.103 Roose-
velt called the two sides together for a meeting and made it plain 
that he favored rapid abolition.104 Roosevelt's decision represented 
a significant victory for the Brandeisians in the administration: the 
holding companies were perhaps the most conspicuous example of 
the curse of bigness.105 
101 See Letter from Ben Cohen to Robert E. Healy, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n 
(Nov. 23, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, 
Reel 113); see also Letter from Ben Cohen to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch. (Nov. 23, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 113) (soliciting Frankfurter's comments on the draft bill). 
'
02 Letter from Ben Cohen to Robert E. Healy, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n (Nov. 
23, 1934) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 
111>· 
1 Schlesinger, supra note 99, at 305. 
'°'Id. 
105 Leuchtenburg, supra note 16, at 156 ("The Public Utilities Holding Company Act 
was a bold stroke against bigness, and the Brandeisians were delighted. 'If F.D. car-
ries through the Holding Company bill we shall have achieved considerable toward 
curbing Bigness."' (quoting Brandeis)). The bill was a victory not only for the Brande-
isians, but also Brandeis himself, who had been pushing for the abolition of the hold-
ing companies behind the scenes. Bruce Allen Murphy, Elements of Extrajudicial 
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The result of the meeting with Roosevelt was a clause calling for 
the elimination of the holding company, which came to be known 
as the "death sentence" provision. 106 The provision effectively lim-
ited utility holding companies to one geographic area; those that 
did not satisfy this requirement were to be broken up under the di-
rection of the SEC. The death sentence provision was a major de~ 
parture from the disclosure paradigm of the Securities and Ex-
change Acts. The holding company legislation followed those laws 
in requiring registration and disclosure, but it broke new ground in 
giving the SEC control over the utilities' capital structures and cor-
porate governance. Thus, the legislation set a new high water mark 
for federal interference with business, albeit one that governed 
only a portion of American business-public utility holding com-
panies. For opponents of federal economic regulation, the holding 
company legislation looked like a trial run for the federal control 
of corporate governance that Douglas and like-minded liberals had 
been seeking. 
The public utilities industry was considerably less enthusiastic 
about being the subject of the federal government's experiments in 
corporate governance. The industry predicted economic disaster if 
the bill were enacted. Wendell Willkie, the president of Common-
wealth and Southern (and future Republican presidential nomi-
nee), was the industry's most articulate spokesman.107 He warned 
that 
the utility industry would be thrown "into a chaos of liquidation 
and receiverships," holders of utility stocks would suffer "practi-
cally complete" losses, and a "great bureaucracy in Washington 
will be regulating the internal affairs of practically all utility op-
erating companies in the United States." The backers of the 
death sentence, Willkie charged, were trying "to 'nationalize' the 
power business of this country."108 
Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, 69 Geo. 
L.J. 101, 120 (1980). 
106 Schlesinger, supra note 99, at 306. 
107 Id. at 308. 
108 Id. at 310. 
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Although his rhetoric was shrill, Willkie's fears of socialism in 
the utility industry were not entirely unfounded.'w More to the 
point, it had political resonance with the voters.110 In a major rebuff 
to Roosevelt, the House rejected the death sentence provision.111 
The industry backed up its public relations attack with a grass-
roots lobbying campaign, but here the industry overreached. After 
allegations surfaced of a raft of telegrams opposing the bill sent by 
fictitious persons, a select committee chaired by then-Senator 
Hugo Black was appointed to investigate the utilities' lobbying 
against the holding company bill. Black pursued his investigation 
"with a fanaticism not surprising in a one-time Klan member. In his 
frenzy to uncover improper lobbying by certain utilities-and there 
was plenty of it-Black struck at the innocent as well as the guilty. 
Opposition to the bill became, ipso facto, an indication of bad 
faith."m Whatever its excesses, the revelations produced by Black's 
investigation gave new hope to the administration for the bill's pas-
sage.113 
Even after the bill passed the Senate, however, it remained bot-
tled up in conference committee. The key disagreement was over 
the death sentence provision. The Senate's version limited holding 
companies to a single "geographically and economically inte-
grated ... system" operating in "contiguous states," while the 
House version required only an "integrated public-utility sys-
tem."114 The President favored the more stringent Senate version, 
but Frankfurter eventually persuaded him to yield.115 Frankfurter 
drafted a compromise that used the House's "integrated public-
'
09 After the enactment of PUHCA, Corcoran told Moley: "It won't come fast, but 
twenty years from now the government will own and operate all the electrical utilities 
in the country." Moley, supra note 21, at 354. 
110 But not with Douglas. Wilkie's efforts on behalf of the utility industry earned him 
Douglas's bitter antipathy. See William 0. Douglas, Diary (Dec. 1, 1939) (on file with 
the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780) ("I had had many 
many contacts with Wilkie at the S.E.C. I was convinced that he was one of the most 
unscrupulous men I had ever met, that he was interested only in power, for himself+ 
for the vested interests, that he had no principles, and that he was the most dangerous 
Fascist threat on the scene."). 
111 Schlesinger, supra note 99, at 311-16. 
112 Moley, supra note 21, at 315; see also Schlesinger, supra note 99, at 318-23. 
113 Schlesinger, supra note 99, at 323-24. 
11
• Parrish, supra note 13, at 250. 
us Moley, supra note 21, at 316 & n.2. 
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utility system" language, but also stipulated that the system could 
not be "so large ... as to impair the advantages of localized man-
agement, efficient operation, or the effectiveness of regulation. "116 
This stipulation was studiously vague; its meaning would have to be 
determined by the SEC, and potentially, the courts. 
E. The Chandler Act of 1938 
Having created the SEC to be the government's expert agent to 
regulate American business, FDR had a ready tool when his ad-
ministration decided to make further inroads into corporate gov-
ernance during his second term. The Chandler Act followed the 
earlier pattern of FDR's securities laws by putting the SEC into the 
center of important business decisions, displacing the traditional 
authority exercised by investment bankers.117 It followed PUHCA 
in going beyond mere disclosure to give the agency a key substan-
tive role in the reorganization of troubled firms. 118 
Bankruptcy reorganization had been on the administration's 
·original business reform agenda. Unlike the subjects of the first 
term securities laws, however-public offerings, the NYSE, and the 
utility holding companies-the abuses of the bankruptcy reorgani-
zation process were not as obvious to the general public. Before re-
form could be adopted, it was necessary to build a case document-
ing the abuses of the protective committees and build broader 
support for government control. 119 
A bankruptcy reform movement had been growing through the 
1920s and into the early 1930s, with well known studies headed by 
New York City lawyers Donovan and then Thatcher showing the 
inadequacies of the existing system.120 Legislation was passed in the 
116 Parrish, supra note 13, at 250. 
111 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in 
America 125 (2001) ("Within a few years, the starring role that the Wall Street bank-
ers had played for more than fifty years was a thing of the past."). 
118 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 171-74, 52 Stat. 840, 890-91. 
119 Ralph F. de Bedts, The New Deal's SEC: The Formative Years 109 (1964) ("In 
his demand for studies and more studies Landis can be likened to the field general 
who will not unnecessarily risk his forces until sure of overwhelming superiority. But 
the many studies begun by Chairman Landis-and frequently used to such good ad-
vantage by his successor, William 0. Douglas-were not born of timidity."). 
120 H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 7lst Cong., Report on the Administration of Bank-
ruptcy Estates (Comm. Print 1931) (Donovan Report); Att'y Gen., Strengthening of 
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dying days of the Hoover administration, supplemented a year 
later by additional legislation under the new administration, re-
vamping the core process for bankruptcy. These measures codified 
the equity receivership proceedings long used in railroad reorgani-
zation for business reorganizations generally, but they did not ad-
dress the role of investment bankers in reorganizations.121 Among 
the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was a direc-
tive that the new Securities and Exchange Commission study pro-
tective committees.122 This study would help establish the political 
case for fundamental changes in business reorganization. Perhaps 
of greater historical significance, the protective committee study 
would provide the entree for a young Yale law professor into gov-
ernment service. 
William 0. Douglas, like Frankfurter, reflected the influence of 
Brandeis: "[Brandeis's] 'Other People's Money,' had been of 
course a Bible for me for years, as had his 'Curse of Bigness,' the 
philosophy of which was my own. "123 As one of the legal realists 
revolutionizing legal scholarship and education, Douglas had been 
pushing corporate reform for years by the time he came to the 
SEC. First at Columbia and then at Yale, Douglas had sought to 
reform a broad area of the business law curriculum. Bankruptcy, 
however, was always a special interest of Douglas's. He had under-
taken an empirical study with a New Jersey federal judge of bank-
ruptcy filings in several districts and had been a part of the Dono-
van and Thatcher reform efforts.124 
Douglas's campaign to be chosen as one of the first five commis-
sioners for the fledgling SEC had been stymied by Landis's opposi-
tion to him based on Douglas's critique of the Securities Act. 
Landis's opposition to Douglas was apparently not deep rooted, 
however, since Landis recruited him to conduct the study of pro-
Procedures in the Judicial System: The Report of the Attorney General on Bank· 
ruptcy Law and Practice, S. Doc. No. 65, at 90-93 (1st Sess. 1932) (Thatcher Report). 
121 Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, §77, 47 Stat. 1474, 1474-82; Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 
424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912-22. 
m Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909. 
123 William 0. Douglas, Diary (Mar. 26, 1939) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780). 
12
' Skeel, supra note 117, at 109. 
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tective committees in bankruptcy mandated by the 1934 Act.125 
Over the next several years Douglas split his time between Wash-
ington and New Haven, assembling a talented team to work on the 
study, including his future Supreme Court colleague, Abe Fortas.126 
This research would eventually catapult Douglas to the SEC 
chairmanship, just as he had planned.121 
By the time the protective committee's study first report was 
ready (there would eventually be eight volumes), bankruptcy re-
form was gaining momentum in Congress.128 Douglas had now 
gained his coveted seat on the Commission, and would soon suc-
ceed Landis as its chairman. He and others described the work of 
the protective committee study as "briefs" for Congressional ac-
tion.129 Three separate bills were under discussion, bearing the 
names of three House members, Sabath, Lea, and Chandler. Sa-
bath's bill sought to name a conservator, an official employed by 
the government, for every bankruptcy.130 The Lea bill, drafted as an 
amendment to the Securities Act of 1933, focused directly on reor-
ganization of public corporations and targeted the central role that 
investment bankers played in this process.131 Chandler's bill, pro-
posed by the second term Congressman from Memphis, had arisen 
from the efforts of a group of bankruptcy lawyers (not including 
the elite firms that dominated reorganization work) that became 
125 See Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to James Landis, 
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n (July 12, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress). 
126 Letter from William 0. Douglas, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to Abe Fortas, Agric. 
Adjustment Admin. (Aug. 2, 1934) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, 
Library of Congress). 
12
' Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill 107 (2003) ("To Douglas, this new appointment 
signaled the beginning of his rise to the top. 'Bill began telling us he would be the 
chairman of the SEC,' recalled Irene Hamilton."). 
128 1-8 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, 
Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees 
(1936-40). 
129 Revision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 6439 Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Reintroduced as H.R. 8046, 75th Cong. 199 (1937) (statement of Wil-
liam 0. Douglas, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n). 
130 See Conservator in Bankruptcy, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, H. 
of Rep., on H.R. 9 and H.R. 6963, 75th Cong. 69 (1937) (statement of Adolph J. Sa-
bath). 
131 To Amend the Securities Act of 1933: Hearings on H.R. 6968 Before the H. 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. (1937). 
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the National Bankruptcy Conference ("NBC").132 The Chandler 
bill covered a host of reforms in the bankruptcy area, but did not 
take up corporate reorganizations. 
Douglas and Fortas were not excited about Sabath's approach; 
they had not been consulted in its drafting. When the investment 
bankers took aim at the Lea bill, the SEC chose to combine its 
proposals with those of the Chandler bill.133 Thus, the SEC's plan 
became Chapter X of the Chandler bill.134 The bill that Congress 
passed the following year required a trustee in every public com-
pany reorganization and that any reorganization plan had to be 
"fair and equitable" to be approved by the court .135 
To ensure that standard was met, the bill directed courts to so-
licit the SEC's advice in reorganizations involving over $3 million 
in debt, permitting its advice to be sought in smaller reorganiza-
tions.136 Bringing the SEC in as an advisor to the court ensured that 
the agency's experts would be the key players in the reorganization 
of public companies, just as the agency played the leading role in 
holding company reorganizations under PUHCA. By giving the 
SEC a central role, Congress thwarted efforts by investment bank-
ers to call around and pick off creditors one by one to gain ap-
proval for a reorganization. A reorganization branch of the SEC 
was established and Chairman Douglas appointed as its head Sam 
Clark, a former member of the protective committee staff and the 
brother of Douglas's former Yale Law dean.137 The following year, 
Congress passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, which closed off 
132 See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Revision of the National Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 
Rep. 1409, at 1-3 (1937) (containing a chronology of the formation of the National 
Bankruptcy Conference). 
133 See Skeel, supra note 117, at 116-17. 
134 The NBC approved the change in the spring of 1937 in a sparsely attended meet-
ing by a split vote of 14 of its 42 members. See Revision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 6439 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Reintroduced as H.R. 8046, 
supra note 129, at 364-65 (statement of John Gerdes) (recounting a meeting of the 
National Bankruptcy Conference in March 1937). 
135 The insertion of trustees brought broad changes in the reorganization process. 
See, e.g., Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 
Colum. L. Rev. 256, 259 (1938) ("In the name of 'democratization' corporate securi-
tyholders are to be enlisted in a war on corporate management. Not merely are bank-
ers to be scourged from the temple, but corporate officers and directors are to be 
driven out with them."). 
136 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 172, 52 Stat. 840, 890-91. 
137 Investor's Advocate, Time, Sept. 26, 1938, at 57. 
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the ability of in.vestment bankers to go outside the reorganization 
process to gain contractual modifications for companies in distress. 
F. Summing Up 
The SEC put into action the New Deal vision that administrative 
experts, not business leaders or the courts, should control the di-
rection of the economy. PUHCA in particular gave the administra-
tive agency a key role in deciding the terms of the breakup of the 
holding companies, a question with enormous economic implica-
tions. How strictly would the SEC enforce PUHCA's purposefully 
vague death sentence provision? Before that question could be re-
solved, PUHCA faced an uncertain judicial future. Roosevelt's ap-
pointees to the Supreme Court would eventually ensure that the 
securities law would pass constitutional muster, as discussed below. 
But, the constitutional question was not the only issue to be re-
solved by the Supreme Court. The rule of law required that the 
SEC follow the terms of the statutes that gave it life. Enforcing 
statutory limits on the SEC clearly was a role for the courts, but 
overly stringent interpretations could hamstring the efforts of the 
fledgling agency to reshape the utility industry. How much defer-
ence would the Court afford the SEC in the interpretation of its 
governing statutes? 
II. THE TRIUMPH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ST ATE 
Through Roosevelt's first term, his battle to tame the power of 
Wall Street had the strong support of Congress and the members 
of his administration. The third branch of government, however, 
looked much less hospitable circa 1935. The Supreme Court, called 
upon to review the New Deal initiatives, was perceived as hostile 
to government regulation, invoking constitutional rights of per-
sonal liberty and due process to block high profile New Deal initia-
tives.138 The New Dealers were experimenting with the regulatory 
138 Felix Frankfurter, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution (1938), in Law and 
Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter 61, 74 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. 
Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939) ("Until after the 1936 election, the Court was back to the high 
tide of judicial negation reached in the Lochner case in 1905."). More recent scholars 
of the period have pointed out the Court's response to the administration was more 
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state, and they faced considerable uncertainty with respect to 
whether their experiments could pass constitutional muster. Joseph 
Rauh later recalled: 
I worked for Ben [Cohen] for a year on defending the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act. He taught me more about how to 
win a case that's unwinnable than anyone else could have. If you 
had asked anyone in 1935 if the Supreme Court would uphold 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, you would have been 
laughed at. 139 
Would Roosevelt's securities laws fall under the judicial axe? 
Roosevelt ultimately prevailed when he was able to appoint law-
yers to the Supreme Court who had a proven record of supporting 
a broad role for government regulation of the economy. While 
waiting for enough vacancies to change the complexion of the 
Court, the administration stalled the consideration of more difficult 
constitutional issues, especially PUHCA's death sentence provi-
sion, betting that it could outlast the Court's Old Guard.140 As 
events unfolded, Roosevelt's appointees would ensure the survival 
of the securities laws, cementing a reversal in the course of consti-
tutional jurisprudence: the federal government now had free rein 
to regulate the economy. Prior to their appointment, however, 
these new Justices were also the key players in devising and im-
plementing this strategy of delay. We saw in Part I that a number 
of the Justices appointed to the Court by Roosevelt participated in 
drafting and enacting the securities laws. In this section, we explore 
the central roles played by future Roosevelt Court appointees in 
defending the securities laws against the initial court challenges. 
A. Delaying the Judicial Resolution of the Initial Challenges to the 
Securities Laws 
Securities laws were part of the initial flurry of legislation in the 
new administration's first hundred days, but resolving the chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the New Deal's legislative pro-
mixed. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 Va. L. 
Rev. 559, 560-61 (1997). 
139 Rauh, supra note 29, at 56-57 (footnote omitted). 
140 John D. Fassett, New Deal Justice: The Life of Stanley Reed of Kentucky 66 
(1994). 
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gram did not follow as quickly. By the time the securities laws 
made their way to court in the latter half of the 1930s, the Roose-
velt administration was dragging out the judicial resolution as long 
as possible, essentially trying to play out the clock on the Justices 
most hostile to federal regulation. The challenge to PUHCA, for 
example, required three visits to the Supreme Court before it was 
ultimately resolved in the government's favor. The Court first ad-
dressed whether a host of individual challenges to the statute could 
be stayed pending Supreme Court consideration of a test case;141 
the second case upheld only the constitutionality of the relatively 
uncontroversial registration and disclosure prov1s1ons of 
PUHCA;142 and the last case-decided a decade after PUHCA's 
enactment-resolved the constitutionality of the controversial 
death sentence provision.143 
Administration strategists had determined to stall in defending 
other parts of the New Deal legislative program as well. The strat-
egy succeeded for a time, only to be dealt a string of defeats in 1935 
and 1936.144 The bloodiest day was Monday, May 27, 1935, when 
two decisions, both unanimous: (1) struck down the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act ("N.l.R.A.");145 and (2) held that the Presi-
dent could not remove members of the Federal Trade Commission 
without cause.146 If there was any doubt that the Court was sending 
Roosevelt a message, Brandeis made it perfectly clear: 
Before Tommy Corcoran could depart, a Supreme Court page 
tapped him on the shoulder and said that Justice Brandeis would 
like to see him in the Justices' robing room. Brandeis wanted 
141 Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 249 (1936). 
142 Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 442-43 (1938). 
143 See N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704 (1946). 
144 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revo-
lution in the Age of Roosevelt 84-89 (1995) ("The [Roosevelt] Administration put off 
tests of the constitutionality of the legislation of the First Hundred Days as long as 
possible; as a result the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to rule on a New 
Deal statute until 1935."). 
145 A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). 
McReynolds credited the Schechter decision with restoring business confidence. The 
Forgotten Memoir of John Knox, supra note 29, at 72 (quoting McReynolds: 
"[B]usinessmen throughout the country have become more and more confident be-
cause of the Court's [Schechter] decision .... The decision stimulated industry, which 
had been hampered by the N.R.A. laws."). · 
146 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935). 
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Corcoran to convey a message to the White House: "This is the 
end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back 
and tell the President that we're not going to let this government 
centralize everything. It's come to an end."147 
SEC General Counsel John Burns, in a letter to Frankfurter, 
noted "how stunned and gloomy the action of the court left us .... 
It appears likely that both of our statutes will be attacked with 
more vigor."148 The old guard appeared skeptical of Roosevelt's 
"road to socialism";149 Brandeis and the other liberals opposed 
regulation that fostered "bigness." The confluence of the two posi-
tions resulted in a stiff rebuke for the Roosevelt administration.150 
1. Jones v. SEC: The SEC as "Star Chamber" 
At the time of those Black Monday decisions, the SEC had just 
launched the case that would be the Supreme Court's first oppor-
tunity to pass on the new securities laws. It would not be an auspi-
cious beginning for the SEC in the Supreme Court. On May 4, 
1935, J. Edward Jones, a dealer in oil royalties, had filed a registra-
tion statement to issue certificates in producing such royalties. Just 
before the end of the twenty-day waiting period required before a 
registration statement can become effective under the Securities 
Act, the SEC filed notice of a stop order proceeding and subpoe-
naed Jones and various documents. When Jones's attorney ap-
peared at the hearing without his client and sought to withdraw the 
registration statement to end the proceeding, SEC General Coun-
147 Irons, supra note 16, at 104. 
148 Letter from John Burns, Gen. Counsel, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, to Felix Frankfurter, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (May 29, 1935) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 84). 
149 The Forgotten Memoir of John Knox, supra note 29, at 72 (quoting McReynolds: 
"[I]f it were not for the Court, this country would go too far down the road to social-
ism ever to return."). 
iio Frankfurter himself was not that distressed by the invalidation of the N.I.R.A. 
According to Moley, 
There's no doubt that Frankfurter, a Brandeis devotee, had a deep antipathy to 
both the A.A.A. and the N.I.R.A. He, as well as most of his young disciples in 
Washington, opposed the loosening up of the antitrust laws involved in the 
N.I.R.A. principle. As avowed enemies of bigness in business, viewing govern-
ment's role as that of policeman, rather than coordinator, they looked upon 
N.I.R.A.'s invalidation with no little satisfaction. 
Moley, supra note 21, at 306-07. 
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sel Burns is said to have responded "You can't go up under the gun 
of a stop order and then seek to avoid it"; the Commission then 
"ordered a U.S. marshal to go forth and fetch Mr. Jones in per-
son."151 The Commission's impatience led it into strategic error; at 
that point, Jones reversed course and announced this case to be 
"an excellent opportunity to test out in a clean-cut fashion the 
much-mooted question of the constitutionality of the securities 
acts. "152 
The lower federal courts upheld the SEC's refusal to permit 
withdrawal of the registration statement; more importantly, they 
affirmed the constitutionality of the Act.153 Jones quickly appealed. 
After the argument of the case in the Supreme Court, Landis re-
ported to Frankfurter that "[t]he only possibility of defeat is on a 
procedural point and yet I cannot see a sane bench of judges not 
giving us some freedom in working out our procedural tech-
nique. "154 
The Supreme Court shortly gave Landis reason to question the 
Justices' sanity. It ruled against the SEC on the withdrawal issue, 
thereby avoiding, for the moment, the constitutional issue.155 The 
tenor of the opinion, however, did not bode well for the Act's con-
stitutionality.156 The 6-3 majority consisted of the "Four Horsemen" 
(Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter), the 
key bloc overturning central parts of the New Deal, joined by 
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts.157 Sutherland's opinion 
151 Royalist's Revelations, Time, July 1, 1935, at 47, available at 
htto://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,770055,00.html. 
I~ Id. 
153 SEC v. Jones, 12 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), aff'd, 79 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 
1935), rev'd, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
154 Letter from James Landis, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, to Felix Frankfurter, 
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 11, 1936) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Reel 45). 
155 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 28 (1936). 
"
6 See generally id. The Court said the stop order proceeding had the effect of sus-
pending the operation of the registration statement; the appellate court had ruled that 
the registration statement remained effective, since no stop order had been issued. Id. 
at 15. 
157 Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion for the court despite not having heard oral 
argument in the case, participating via the "vouch[ing in]" approach that Chief Justice 
Hughes employed. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Arthur Gold-
berg (Jan. 18, 1964) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Con-
gress). 
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for the Court treated the securities registration process as little 
more than a license to use the mails.158 Under the common law, 
such a license would carry with it an absolute right to withdraw.159 
More provocatively, Sutherland characterized the SEC's investiga-
tion not based on specified grounds as infringing on the "constitu-
tional safeguards of personal liberty."160 
Although the government avoided a direct constitutional loss, 
the Court did not shrink from finding the agency was running afoul 
of personal liberties the Court was determined to protect.161 Label-
ing the action of the Commission as "wholly unreasonable and ar-
bitrary," the Court stressed the need to block unauthorized powers 
by "lesser agencies" as well as the three primary departments of 
the government, concluding that the Commission's action 
amounted to a "fishing bill." The Court's opinion lumped together 
the SEC's investigation, which was not based on specified grounds, 
with the "intolerable abuses of the Star Chamber which brought 
that institution to an end at the hands of the Long Parliament in 
1640."162 The Court took the occasion to announce that it stood 
vigilant to check such abuses: "Even the shortest step in the direc-
tion of curtailing one of these rights must be halted in limine, lest it 
serve as a precedent for further advances in the same direction, or 
for wrongful invasions of the others."163 
Cardozo's dissent, joined by Stone and Brandeis, ridiculed the 
comparison of the SEC to the Star Chamber: 
A Commission which is without coercive power, which cannot 
arrest or amerce or imprison though a crime has been uncovered, 
or even punish for contempt, but can only inquire and report, the 
propriety of every question in the course of the inquiry being 
subject to the supervision of the ordinary courts of Justice, is lik-
158 Jones, 298 U.S. at 22. 
159 Id at 23. 
'"'Id. 
161 Reed had not predicted a tougher go on the constitutional argument. He wrote 
Homer Cummings, the Attorney General, that '"I think that if we lose, it will be on 
the statutory construction point and not on the constitutional point. We may get a 
good result and I would be very much surprised if we got a bad result."' Fassett, supra 
note 140, at 121. 
162 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 28 (1936). 
•63 Id. 
878 Virginia Law Review (Vol. 95:841 
ened with denunciatory fervor to the Star Chambers of the Stu-
arts. Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile.164 
Justice Stone grumbled to Frankfurter that the opinion "was 
written for morons. "165 Frankfurter complained that the Court was 
"making a mockery of great fundamental constitutional experi-
ences and traditions to invoke them with the silly irrelevance with 
which they were invoked" in Jones. 166 Stone responded that Jones 
was an example of the Supreme Court at its worst. He observed: 
I do not suppose the heavens will fall, whether or not Mr. J. Ed-
ward Jones, in a public hearing, surrounded by all the safeguards 
of the Constitution, is compelled to explain the discrepancies of 
his statements in the public document which he had filed, but 
when our Court sets at naught a plain command of Congress, 
without the invocation of any identifiable prohibition of the Con-
stitution, and supports it only by platitudinous irrelevancies, it is 
a matter of transcendent importance.167 
Whatever the quality (or long-term impact) of the opinion, the 
decision resonated in the public debate at the time.168 Frankfurter 
passed on to Stone an observation from SEC general counsel 
Burns: "There is hardly a crook in the country whose lawyer does 
not come in to read juicy extracts from Sutherland's oration .... 
[T]his decision will be a constant source of annoyance in our en-
forcement activities. "169 
164 Id. at 33 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
165 Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch., (Apr. 7, 1936) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 64). 
166 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone (Apr. 7, 1936) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 64). 
167 Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard 
Law Sch. (Apr. 9, 1936) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 64). 
168 Fassett, supra note 140, at 124 ("The Jones decision was publicized by opponents 
of the New Deal as affording proof that FDR's alphabet agencies did in fact engage in 
'Star Chamber' proceedings.' Enforcement actions pursuant to the securities acts par-
ticularly were seriously impeded as claims of abuse of administrative powers prolifer-
ated."). 
169 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone, (May 18, 1936) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of 
Congress, Reel 64) (quoting John Bums). 
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With the Court's decisions in the months on either side of the 
Jones case invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act170 and the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act,171 the constitutional fate of the 
securities acts remained in doubt. To face that challenge, the ad-
ministration deployed a considerable array of legal talent, bringing 
the leading legal lights of the New Deal to bear. Solicitor General 
Stanley Reed argued the Jones case before the Court; Reed regu-
larly consulted Frankfurter regarding litigation strategy.in The 
Roosevelt administration also brought Robert Jackson in as special 
counsel to aid the SEC; Jackson had been serving as assistant gen-
eral counsel at the Treasury.113 
At times the legal team and the political team overlapped. The 
briefs in the North American case,114 addressed in the next section, 
for example, were prepared by the same team as Jones-Attorney 
General Homer Cummings, Solicitor General Stanley Reed, and 
SEC General Counsel John Bums-again reinforced by now-
Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson.175 Also on the briefs 
as special counsel were Ben Cohen and Tommy Corcoran, Frank-
furter's all-purpose pair who had come to Washington in 1933 to 
rewrite the Securities Act and stayed to fill a variety of roles in the 
110 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936). 
171 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311-17 (1936). 
172 See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Stanley 
Reed, Solicitor Gen. (Feb. 15, 1936) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, 
Harvard Law School Library, Reel 2); Letter from Stanley Reed, Solicitor Gen., to 
Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Dec. 17, 1936) (on file with the Felix 
Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 3, Reel 2) ("My own views 
have not chrystalized [sic]. Can you help me?"); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Pro-
fessor, Harvard Law Sch., to Stanley Reed, Solicitor Gen. (Dec. 7, 1936) (on file with 
the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 3, Reel 2) ("I ap-
preciate your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of your confidential memorandum 
on pending matters involving administration measures."). Frankfurter also consulted 
with John Burns, the SEC's general counsel. See Letter from John Burns, Gen. Coun-
sel, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Oct. 18, 
1935) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 115) 
(discussing litigation strategy with respect to constitutional issues). 
173 Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dept., to Herman 
Oliphant, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dept. (Dec. 8, 1935) (on file with the Robert Jack-
son Collection, Library of Congress, Box 66). 
174 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). 
175 Brief for the Petitioners at 97, Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (Nos. 221-
22). 
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New Deal, including drafting and lobbying for the Exchange Act 
and PUHCA. 116 
2. PU HCA 's Opening Act: Finding a Test Case 
During the nine months that it took for the Jones case to move 
from the SEC to a Supreme Court resolution, litigation was begin-
ning that would lead to the Court's next two securities cases. 
PUHCA was enacted in August 1935, becoming effective on De-
cember 1 of that year. A flood of lawsuits quickly followed from af-
fected companies seeking injunctions to block the enforcement of 
the law; 177 the government looked to litigate the case with the 
strongest facts. 118 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC,119 with its maze 
of subsidiaries, was that test case. The government filed a suit in 
New York federal court on November 26 that would eventually 
become the vehicle for the first Supreme Court opinion on the con-
stitutionality of PUHCA's registration provisions.180 On the same 
day, the North American Company, a large holding company, filed 
a suit in the District of Columbia that would first become the basis 
for the Supreme Court's consideration of whether a stay was per-
missible, and then the ultimate decision on the Act's constitutional-
ity. That decision would come more than a decade after the suit 
was first filed. 
In January 1936, the government persuaded the district court in 
the District of Columbia to grant a stay in the North American 
case, but the D.C. Circuit reversed in June, with the four judges 
splitting 2-1-1.181 The Supreme Court heard the case a week after 
Roosevelt's smashing landslide in the 1936 election. Within a 
month, a unanimous court reversed the Court of Appeals, permit-
ting a stay of the other cases until the decision of the trial court in 
176 Lash, supra note 29, at 36. 
m N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. at 252 (noting that forty-seven other cases had been filed); 
Seligman, supra note 1, at 134. 
178 William 0. Douglas, Go East Young Man: The Early Years 278 (1974). 
179 303 U.S. 419 (1938). 
180 Courts in jurisdictions other than the D.C. Circuit could not compel the SEC to 
be a party, so the SEC could control its venue as long as it did not attempt to enforce 
the act. Seligman, supra note 1, at 137. 
181 N. Am. Co. v. Landis, 85 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1936). 
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New York.182 In contrast to the hostility toward the SEC and its 
processes that was visible in Jones, this opinion, written by Justice 
Cardozo for a unanimous Court, was considerably more accommo-
dating toward agency action: 
We must be on our guard against depriving the processes of jus-
tice of their suppleness of adaptation to varying conditions. Es-
pecially in cases of extraordinary public moment, the individual 
may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and 
not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or con-
venience will thereby be promoted. In these Holding Company 
Act cases great issues are involved, great in their complexity, 
great in their significance .... An application for a stay in suits so 
weighty and unusual will not always fit within the mold appropri-
ate to an application for such relief in a suit upon a bill of 
goods.183 
Not only did the SEC win, but the caustic language of Jones had 
also disappeared. 
Despite this procedural victory, PUHCA, like other New Deal 
legislation, remained at risk in the shadow cast by the Supreme 
Court's constitutional holdings in 1935 and 1936. In the weeks im-
mediately after Landis, President Roosevelt announced his Court-
packing plan, which was met by a barrage of criticism that domi-
nated political debate for the first half of 1937. The Supreme Court 
that would eventually uphold the constitutionality of economic 
regulation, including the securities laws, was not yet visible. 
3. Litigating the Chosen Case: Electric Bond & Share 
While the Court-packing debate was unfolding in Congress and 
the media, the government was litigating its chosen PUHCA case, 
Electric Bond & Share,184 on narrow ground. In January 1937, the 
district court (with Circuit Judge Mack as the trial judge) ruled that 
182 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 259 (1936). McReynolds concurred in the re-
sult without opinion and Stone did not participate, likely because of his prior partner-
shig with Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm for the company. 
1 Id. at 256. The stay approved by the Court was narrow, however, extending "[f]or 
the moment" only until the first district court decision in the New York litigation. Id. 
at 256-57. 
184 SEC v. Elec. Bond & Share Co., 18 F. Supp 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). 
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the constitutionality of the registration provisions of the legislation 
could be separated from the more controversial provisions permit-
ting the SEC to impose the death sentence on a holding company; 
the court then upheld the constitutionality of the registration pro-
visions.185 The Second Circuit affirmed in a split decision. 186 
Time was on the Roosevelt administration's side. In the period 
between the district court and Supreme Court decisions, Roose-
velt's Court-packing plan had been rebuffed by Congress, but the 
Court's direction had nonetheless changed radically. The West 
Coast Hotel decision upholding the Washington state minimum 
wage act was announced on March 29, 1937,187 and was quickly (if 
erroneously) immortalized as "the switch in time that saved 
nine." 188 In subsequent opinions that term, the Court upheld the 
National Labor Relations Act189 and the Social Security tax.190 At 
the end of the term, Willis Van Devanter retired, to be replaced by 
Hugo Black, and by the middle of the following term when the 
Court heard arguments in Electric Bond, Sutherland had also re-
tired. Although Justice Sutherland's replacement, Solicitor Gen-
eral Stanley Reed, did not participate in the decision, the departure 
185 Id. at 147. This was friendly ground for the SEC; Mack was a friend of Frank-
furter and Cohen had served as his law clerk. Seligman, supra note 1, at 136. 
186 Judge Manton's lead opinion upheld the registration provisions as akin to regis-
tration of securities. Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 92 F.2d 580, 590 (2d Cir. 1937). 
Judge Swan concurred in the result without an opinion, id. at 593 (Swan, J., concur-
ring in the result), and Learned Hand wrote separately to say he would uphold sec-
tions 4 and 5 (the registration provisions) along with sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 after 
doubtful portions were removed. Id. (Hand, J., concurring). 
181 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
188 On the original source of the phrase, see G. Edward White, The Constitution and 
the New Deal 17 (2000). Scholars have recently questioned the extent to which Rob-
erts "switched," given that he voted at the conference before the announcement of 
the Court-packing plan. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: 
The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 103 (1998) [hereinafter Cushman, Re-
thinking the New Deal Court]. At the time, however, Frankfurter viewed the switch 
as transparent. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, (Mar. 30, 1937) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter 
Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Reel 155) ("And now, with the shift by 
Roberts, even a blind man ought to see that the Court is in politics, and understand 
how the Constitution is 'judicially' construed."). Professor Cushman, in his commen-
tary in this symposium, addresses Frankfurter's later view backing away from his ear-
lier comment. See Barry Cushman, The Securities Laws and the Mechanics of Legal 
Change, 95 Va. L. Rev. 927, 933 (2009). 
189 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937). 
190 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301U.S.548, 598 (1937). 
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of two of the four Horsemen changed the balance of power on the 
Court. 
Oral arguments before the Supreme Court went on for three 
days in early February 1938; Robert Jackson and Ben Cohen ar-
gued for the govemment.191 Six weeks later, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Hughes, the Court ruled 6-1 that the registration provisions 
were separable and that regulation requiring the submission of in-
formation was both familiar and constitutional. m Thus, the Court 
both upheld a portion of PUHCA and implicitly affirmed the con-
stitutionality of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Although 
the Court upheld the registration provisions, it declined to consider 
constitutional challenges to PUHCA's much more controversial 
reorganization provisions.193 Nonetheless, the SEC, under the lead-
ership of then-Chairman William 0. Douglas, took the Court's de-
cision as a green light to begin enforcing PUHCA.194 Frankfurter 
telegrammed congratulations to Jackson when the decision was 
announced.195 
B. The New Deal Justices on the Court 
1. U.S. Realty and the Emergence of the Roosevelt Court 
The outcome of U.S. Realty196 in May 1940 made plain the tri-
umph of the administrative state in the securities arena and the 
191 Letter from Stanley Reed, Solicitor Gen., to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Har-
vard Law Sch., (Dec. 19, 1937) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard 
Law School Library, Reel 56) ("We are filing our response in E. B. & S. tomorrow. 
Ben and Bob Jackson are to argue it. I think they have both earned the right .... "). A 
colleague described to Frankfurter Cohen's argument in an "electric" courtroom. Let-
ter from Dave G[insburg] to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Feb. 12, 
1938) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, 
Reel 27). 
192 Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 442-43 (1938). Hughes's opinion 
gained the support of Butler and Roberts from the Jones majority as well as Brandeis 
and Stone from the minority and new appointee Black (who had helped push the law 
through the Senate). McReynolds dissented without opinion. Reed, who was solicitor 
general when the case was argued below, did not participate, nor did Cardozo, who 
died shortly after the term ended. 
193 Id. at 443. 
194 Seligman, supra note 1, at 179-80. 
195 See Telegram from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Robert H. 
Jackson, Solicitor Gen. (Mar. 30, 1938) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, 
Harvard Law School Library, Part 3, Reel 1). 
196 SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940). 
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central role the New Deal Justices played in that transformation. 
At issue was the SEC's authority under the Chandler Act in com-
pany reorganizations. Robert Jackson, soon to be the seventh of 
FDR's eight appointments to the Court, argued the case as the na-
tion's Attorney General. By that time, the Court had already been 
transformed. The change is best seen by comparing the result in 
U.S. Realty with Jones v. SEC, the non-PUHCA securities case that 
had been decided four terms earlier. In U.S. Realty, a 5-3 majority 
approved a broad role for the SEC in a corporate reorganization in 
bankruptcy .197 Stone (long sympathetic to the goals of the Roose-
velt administration, as we have seen) joined with four new Roose-
velt appointees to make a majority; the three remaining members 
of the Jones majority (Hughes, Roberts and McReynolds) were 
now in dissent. 198 
Like PUHCA, this act allowed the SEC an oversight role in cor-
porate transactions, here bankruptcy reorganizations. Stone's ma-
jority opinion connects Chapter X to the other New Deal securities 
statutes, each of which injects the SEC's "impartial and expert ad-
ministrative assistance" for the protection of the public.199 Stone's 
opinion upheld the trial court's determination-following the rec-
ommendation of the SEC-that the bankrupt company should be 
required to reorganize under the new Chapter X provided by the 
Chandler Act, rather than under Chapter XI. The SEC had argued 
that Chapter XI did not provide the safeguards of an independent 
trustee or the SEC as a monitor. The Court rejected the Commis-
sion's argument that public companies always must reorganize un-
der Chapter X because it did not find a bright-line division be-
tween public and private companies in the statutory language. 
Nevertheless, the Court gave the SEC broad license to police im-
proper uses of Chapter XI, despite the fact that the Act was 
equally silent on this point.200 The opinion below had concluded 
197 Id. at 460-61. 
198 Id. at 441, 461, 469. Douglas did not participate. Id. at 461. 
199 Id. at 448 n.6 ("The basic assumption of Chapter X and other acts administered 
by the Commission is that the investing public dissociated from control or active par-
ticipation in the management, needs impartial and expert administrative assistance in 
the ascertainment of facts, in the detection of fraud, and in the understanding of com-
plex financial problems."). 
200 The Court found: 
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that "[a] governmental agency has no general right of intervention 
'in the public interest.'"201 The Court's majority, however, located 
that authority in the public policy of the Act, including not just the 
statute's terms but also in the equity power of the bankruptcy 
court.202 
Douglas did not participate in the decision. For three years he 
had headed the SEC's reorganization project which had culmi-
nated in Chapter X of the Chandler Act. Moreover, he was chair-
man of the SEC when that initiative was attached to other parts of 
bankruptcy reform. By his account, however, there was no basis for 
disqualification: 
I sat on the case[.] I was not disqualified, having nothing to do 
with the matter when I was at the SEC. But I discovered later 
that the CJ [Hughes] was very anxious to have me withdraw. 
Stone told me "The Chief would like to have you out of the 
case." "Why?" I asked. "Because your vote will make it more 
difficult for him to carry the Court," said Stone. So [I] spoke to 
the Chief, telling him that I was not disqualified but stating that 
perhaps I should not participate. He said he thought that would 
be wise, since I had been so recently connected with the SEC. If 
the Chief had had his way, it would be another Jones decision.203 
Notwithstanding his formal non-participation, Douglas's views 
may have shaped the debate. He wrote a memorandum in the case, 
The Commission's duty and its interest extend not only to the performance of 
its prescribed functions where a petition is filed under Chapter X, but to the 
prevention, so far as the rules of procedure permit, of interferences with their 
performance through improper resort to a Chapter XI proceeding in violation 
of the public policy of the Act .... 
Id. at 459. 
201 In re U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 108 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1940). 
202 SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 448 (1940).The Court 
stated that "we cannot assume that Congress has disregarded well settled principles of 
equity." Id. at 457. The dissent, by Justice Roberts, joined by Hughes and Butler, 
sought to refute the SEC's argument of a bright line between chapters X and XI. Id. 
at 464 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The Court's majority did not draw such a line, focus-
ing instead on a trial court's discretion to use its power in particular circumstances. Id. 
at 455 (majority opinion). 
203 William 0. Douglas, Diary (May 27, 1940) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780). Douglas's account is certainly open to 
question; it is somewhat difficult to imagine the magisterial Hughes stooping to such a 
gambit, and it seems somewhat unlikely that he would use Stone as his messenger. 
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which he shared with Frankfurter and perhaps with Stone, which 
rejected the sharp line between Chapters X and XI for which the 
SEC had argued. Instead, Douglas suggested guidelines for the ex-
ercise of judicial discretion.204 Douglas's guidelines are consistent 
with, although not identical to, the reasons offered in Stone's opin-
ion. 
With U.S. Realty, the triumph of the administrative state was 
complete. In four years, the SEC had gone from being denounced 
as a "Star Chamber" in Jones to being deemed essential to investor 
protection in U.S. Realty. This transformation was a critical part of 
the Roosevelt administration's overall judicial triumph.205 
Three unanimous opinions during the term following U.S. Realty 
show the Roosevelt Court's generous approach to securities cases. 
204 Note from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice William 0. Douglas (undated), ap-
pended to Memorandum from William 0. Douglas on SEC v. U.S. Realty & Im-
provement Co. (undated) ("Bill, Hadn't you better send a copy of this memo to 
Stone? FF") (on file with the William 0. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress). 
In overturning the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court had the benefit of 
a strong dissenting opinion authored by Judge Charles Clark. Clark asserted that the 
Court of Appeals' decision "goes far to render abortive what might have proved one 
of the most important corporate reforms of modern times." In re U.S. Realty & Im-
provement Co., 108 F.2d at 802 (Clark, J., dissenting). Clark, who had been Dean of 
Yale Law School during the decade in which Douglas split his time between New Ha-
ven and Washington, knew Douglas well. What is more, Clark's brother Sam had 
worked with Douglas on the protective committee report and later was named by 
Chairman Douglas as first head of the agency's reorganization section. Investor's Ad-
vocate, Time, Sept. 26, 1938, at 57, available at http://timeinc8-sdll.websys.aol.com/ 
time/printout/0,8816,788825,00.html. 
Douglas participated in the Court's next case addressing the securities aspect of 
bankruptcy, writing the opinion for the Court in General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 
U.S. 462 (1956). That opinion tracks Douglas's earlier memo and Stone's U.S. Realty 
opinion in rejecting a bright line approach; the opinion suggests criteria, now grouped 
under the heading of "needs to be served" for determining when bankrupts must pro-
ceed through Chapter X. Id. at 466. Douglas's adherence to a multifactor test left the 
door open to public corporation reorganization through Chapter XI. That space al-
lowed companies to avoid the SEC's role in reorganizations. The SEC's participation 
was largely eliminated with the bankruptcy reforms of 1978. See David A. Skeel, The 
Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy 2-3 (Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 267, 1999), available at http:/lpapers.ssrn/paper.taf?abstract_id=l 72030. 
2~ See Leuchtenburg, supra note 144, at 154. ("This new Court-the 'Roosevelt 
Court' as it was called-ruled favorably on every one of the New Deal laws whose 
constitutionality was challenged. It expanded the commerce power and the taxing and 
spending power so greatly that it soon became evident that there was almost no stat-
ute for social welfare or the regulation of business that the Court would not vali-
date."). 
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Deckert v. Independence Shares Corporation, written by Murphy, 
overturned a court of appeals decision that had blocked relief 
against third parties under the Securities Act.206 In permitting the 
plaintiff to go beyond express money judgment against the seller 
provided by Section 12(1) of the Act, the Court took a broad view 
of remedies (and thus anticipated the Barak case that arose a quar-
ter century later207): 
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the 
right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make 
the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of 
the procedures or actions normally available to litigant according 
to the exigencies of the particular case.208 
The other two securities decisions handed down that term had 
less lasting significance. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines 
Corporation209 was Justice McReynolds' last opinion for the Court 
before his midterm retirement; he was the last of the Four Horse-
men to depart the Court. The Court overturned a broad Idaho Su-
preme Court decision that declared an agreement in violation of 
the Act to be void ab initio.210 Edwards v. United States, the third 
case of that term and the first criminal securities case to reach the 
Court, was a rare, albeit mild, post-Jones rebuke to the govern-
ment.211 Justice Reed, writing for the Court, overturned a convic-
2()6 311 U.S. 282 (1940). Douglas did not participate. The injured investor was 
unlikely to be able to recover from the asserted wrongdoer, but there were funds that 
had been paid to a bank which had acted as trustee. Id. at 284-85, 291. 
200 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964) (discussing the "duty of the 
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the 
congressional purpose" and quoting Deckert, 311 U.S. at 288). 
208 Deckert, 311 U.S. at 288 ("That it does not authorize the bill in so many words is 
no more significant than the fact that it does not in terms authorize execution to issue 
on a judgment recovered under § 12(2). "). 
200 312 U.S. 38 (1941). Douglas did not participate. Id. at 45. 
210 Id. at 44-45. The SEC was concerned that such a broad holding could thwart pro-
tections for the investing public in other situations; the Court agreed without getting 
into questions such as in pari delicto. The Court quoted extensively from a SEC 
memorandum expressing concern that a void ab initio holding would prevent an issu-
ing company from recovering the sales proceeds from its underwriter in a transaction 
where there had been a violation. Id. at 43 n.2. 
211 312 U.S. 473 (1941). Douglas did not participate. Id. at 484. 
888 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:841 
tion when the defendant had not been provided a transcript of his 
appearance in an SEC investigation.212 
The remaining two non-PUHCA securities cases of this earliest 
period are the ones most familiar to current students of securities 
laws. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. 213 and SEC v. W. J. 
Howey Co.,214 the Court established the test for defining a security 
that is still used today. Joiner, a 7-1 decision with Jackson writing 
for the majority, refused to be cabined by traditional rules of statu-
tory interpretation, dismissing them as "com[ing] down to us from 
sources that were hostile toward the legislative process itself."215 
Jackson focused instead on the statute's "dominating general pur-
pose."216 The Court looked to an instrument's character in com-
merce, noting that the "exploration enterprise was woven into 
these leaseholds, in both an economic and legal sense. "211 
Howey, written by Murphy, digs deeper into the policy underly-
ing the general term of investment contract, announcing a test 
broader than Joiner's focus on speculation. W.J. Howey Co. solic-
ited prospective investors, who were staying at a nearby resort that 
Howey itself owned and operated.218 The company offered narrow 
212 Id. at 482. The government asserted that the defendant had given no testimony of 
an incriminating nature and had offered a transcript to the court below, but Reed's 
opinion insisted on a right to cross-examine with the transcript as part of a certified 
record: "The refusal to permit the accused to prove his defense may prove trivial 
when the facts are developed. Procedural errors often are. But procedure is the skele-
ton which forms and supports the whole structure of a case." Id. 
213 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Douglas did not participate, which was his practice in all of 
the securities cases to this point. Usually his file includes a brief memo from his secre-
tary, Edith Walters (who had also been with Douglas at the SEC), describing the 
SEC's involvement with the case. In this case, the memo relates that Orval Dubois 
had reported that the present case had been opened quite recently and that there was 
an earlier investigation, described as informal which never reached the Commission 
and was closed by the staff in February 1936. Douglas had become a commissioner in 
January of 1936. SEC Historical Summary of Chairman and Commissioners (Feb. 23, 
2009), http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm. 
21
• 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
215 Joiner, 320 U.S. at 350. 
210 Id. at 350-51. 
217 Id. at 348. Later, Jackson returned to the importance of the enterprise in giving 
an example about cemetery plots. "One's cemetery lot is not ordinarily thought of as 
an investment and is most certainly real estate. But when such interests become the 
subject of speculation in connection with the cemetery enterprise, courts have held 
conveyances of these lots to be securities." Id. at 352 n.10. 
218 Howey, 328 U.S. at 296. 
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strips of land in orange tree groves as well as service contracts 
(through its Howey-in-the-Hills affiliate) to service the land, collect 
the oranges, and sell them at market.219 The service contracts pro-
vided that the oranges would be pooled from all the strips of trees 
for which there was a similar service agreement. Profits from the 
pooled oranges then would be distributed to the various service 
contract holders.220 Despite the presence of some investors who 
purchased only the land contract and not the service contract, the 
Court framed the issue as whether the offers of orange grove and. 
service contracts constituted offers of investment contracts and 
therefore securities.221 In the course of concluding that that the 
combination of land and services contracts was an investment con-
tract, the Court announced what is now known as the Howey test: 
(1) investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) expecta-
tion of profits, (4) from the efforts of another.222 This test continues 
to control the definition of an investment contract to this day. 
Frankfurter found himself in dissent, siding with the lower courts 
against a contrary agency argument. Noting that the district court 
had found that the contracts were not a security, and that the find-
ing had been affirmed by the court of appeals, Frankfurter invoked 
"the wise rule of judicial administration under which this Court 
does not upset concurrent findings of two lower courts in the ascer-
tainment of facts and the relevant inferences to be drawn from 
them."223 This focus on deference to the lower courts did not per-
suade Frankfurter's colleagues; even Reed, who had voted with 
Frankfurter at conference,224 ended up joining Murphy's majority 
opinion. Frankfurter would level far more substantial criticism at 
the SEC in Chenery and related cases discussed in the next section. 
21
• Id. at 295-96. 
220 Id. at 299 ("They are offering an opportunity to contribute money and to share in 
the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by respon-
dents."). 
221 Interestingly, the focus on offers, rather than sales, a critical element of the analy-
sis, was not in the draft that Murphy first circulated. See Memorandum from Justice 
Frank Murphy to the Conference re no. 843-S.E.C. v. Howey Co. (May 17, 1946) (on 
file with the Wiley Rutledge Collection, Library of Congress Box 141). 
222 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). 
223 Id. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
224 Conference Notes of Justice Harold Burton, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. (undated) 
(on file with the Harold Burton Collection, Library of Congress, Box 128). 
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2. Anticlimactic Triumph: North American v. SEC 
The Supreme Court finally upheld the constitutionality of the 
SEC's power to break up public utility holding companies in 1946, 
eleven years after the statute's enactment, and almost a decade af-
ter the Court's first PUHCA decision in Landis v. North Ameri-
can.225 By that point, doubts about the scope of the federal govern-
ment's power under the commerce clause had disappeared, making 
the Court's unanimous decisions in these cases mere afterthoughts. 
SEC administrative decisions ordering the break up of the North 
American and Electric Bond holding companies came down in 
1942. The SEC's action in North American under Section ll(b)(l) 
of the Act was affirmed by the Second Circuit in January of 1943 
and the agency's action ordering dissolution of two Electric Bond 
subsidiaries under Section ll(b )(2) of the Act was affirmed by the 
First Circuit in March of 1944. The involvement of Justices Doug-
las, Reed, and Jackson in earlier PUHCA litigation before coming 
to the Court (described in the prior section), along with the in-
volvement of Chief Justice Stone's former firm in some of the 
PUHCA litigation, prevented the Court from assembling the re-
quired six member quorum for many PUHCA cases until the 1945 
term. Stone's decision to sit in the holding company cases to form a 
quorum provoked conflict among the brethren.226 Even then, 
225 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 259 (1936). 
"'See Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy: The Washington Years 250 (1984) ("When be-
cause of quorum problems in the 1943 term Stone stated in conference that he would 
sit in a holding company case despite having previously disqualified himself in a simi-
lar case, Roberts exploded and said that 'he would write and tell the world about 
Stone.' The chief justice 'turned white' and responded that no one would tell him in 
what cases he should disqualify himself. Although it was 'a very embarrassing situa-
tion' for him, he was 'willing to be the goat' and to participate in the two cases .... "); 
see also Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 640-41 (1956) 
("The Chief Justice was much disturbed that litigants, otherwise entitled to it, could 
not have their day in Court. His concern grew as more cases involving features of the 
holding company law were filed. Should not this consideration, he wondered, over-
balance those that moved him initially to announce disqualification? As no former 
law partner or client was present in these cases, he now saw no reason to disqualify 
himself. When he broached the matter in conference, however, Justice Roberts ob-
jected to his sitting on the ground that similar issues were raised in all the cases, and 
that if he were disqualified in the one, he ought not to sit in judgment on a related 
case. Roberts' suggestion, apparently querying the Chief Justice's honor and implying 
that he would discuss in an opinion the propriety of Stone's sitting, brought on a 
heated debate. The accusation so angered the Chief that he had his clerk prepare a 
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Stone's unexpected death, just three weeks after the North Ameri-
can decision was announced, but before the Electric Bond decision 
was handed down, destroyed the fragile quorum for the second 
case and sent it back for reargument the following fall. 221 
When the North American v. SEC decision came down, it was an 
enthusiastic validation of the SEC's power to break up utility hold-
ing companies. Justice Murphy wrote the decision, which focused 
on the constitutional claims.228 At this point in the Court's history, 
the commerce clause question was easily dispatched; the "relation-
ship to interstate commerce is so clear and definite as to make any 
other conclusion unreasonable."229 Murphy's opinion painted with a 
broad, moralistic brush, noting that limits on the commerce clause 
powers do not "render the nation powerless to defend itself against 
economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of 
the national economy."230 It went directly at the "white collar" con-
duct as within the evil that government could pursue: "The fact 
that an evil may involve a corporation's financial practices, its 
business structure or its security portfolio does not detract from the 
memorandum of cases on which Roberts had sat although his old firm or former cli-
ents were involved." (footnotes omitted)). 
221 See Letter from Justice Frank Murphy to Chief Justice Fred Vinson (October 9, 
1946) (on file with the Frank Murphy Collection, University of Michigan) ("I had fin-
ished most of the work on the Engineers Public Service and the American Power & 
Light-Electric Power & Light opinions and was about ready to circulate them when, 
unfortunately, the good Chief Justice died, destroying the necessary quorum."). The 
Engineers Public Service case was eventually dismissed as moot. Eng'rs Pub. Serv. Co. 
v. SEC, 332 U.S. 788, 788 (1947). 
228 N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946). Justices Douglas, Jackson and Reed did 
not participate. Id. at 711. Frankfurter wrote Reed during the time when the quorum 
problem remained unresolved: 
[Y]ou are right in not sitting in the North American case .... I also know that 
the people who were eager to have you sit were not moved by the considera-
tions that should move a court. They counted on your deciding their way, which 
is precisely the reason why the other side would have had a just grievance. And 
you do not alleviate a grievance by showing that similar grievances that others 
might have had in the past were equally disregarded. Nor are feelings of injus-
tice rendered unreasonable by having those who inflict them tell those who feel 
them they are really quite unreasonable in feeling them. That psychological fact 
is, I believe, at the core of the labor problem as it is of the race problem. 
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Stanley Reed (Mar. 27, 1944) (on file 
with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Reel 56). 
22
• N. Am. Co., 327 U.S. at 703. 
230 Id. at 705. 
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power of Congress under the commerce clause to promulgate rules 
in order to destroy that evil. "231 
The easy constitutional victory of 1946 should not obscure the 
challenge posed in 1935 and 1936. At that time, securing the Su-
preme Court's assent to an expert administrative agency's radical 
transformation of an American industry was highly uncertain. The 
administration's strategy "to postpone review ... and to increase 
the chance that the test cases would be heard by a more receptive 
Supreme Court"232 succeeded; the role of the SEC in regulating the 
financial community was assured. The question that remained was 
how much discretion the Court would afford the SEC; we explore 
that topic in the next section. 
Ill. TENSION AMIDST TRIUMPH 
As we have seen, by 1940 Roosevelt had succeeded in appoint-
ing a majority of Justices to the Court who shared his views on the 
need for governmental control over business. Given the role that 
the nominees had played in the front lines of the battle for regula-
tory supremacy over capitalism, it is hardly surprising that they 
consistently upheld the constitutional power of the federal gov ... 
ernment to regulate, not only the capital markets, but business 
generally. 
Although the hurdle of constitutionality had been overcome, it 
remained for the Court to work out the relationship between law 
(and implicitly, courts) and administration (that is, the SEC). 
Would the Roosevelt Court defer to the SEC's expertise, or would 
it constrain administrative discretion through narrow interpreta-
tions of the statutes that gave the SEC its authority? Should the 
SEC be able to proceed through case-by-case enforcement, which 
would afford the agency maximum flexibility, or should it have to 
regulate through rulemaking, giving business prospective notice of 
the rules of the game? The answer to these questions had impor-
tant implications, not just for securities law, but also for the legal 
foundations of the New Deal. Would the administrative state be 
the rule of experts, or would judges play the dominant role? 
231 Id. at 706. Murphy similarly disposed of the due process clause claim, permitting 
Congress to balance the various considerations. Id. at 708. 
232 Fassett, supra note 140, at 66. 
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In between U.S. Realty in 1940, the Court's first securities case in 
which the Roosevelt appointees gave the government a majority, 
and the Court's unanimous upholding of the constitutionality of 
PUHCA in North American in 1946, which represented the com-
plete triumph of administrative power, fissures began to develop 
along the fault line between experts and judges. Frankfurter the 
professor had bitterly criticized the interventions of the Supreme 
Court into state regulatory efforts,233 but Frankfurter the Justice 
was much less willing to defer to the SEC. Beginning in the early 
1940s, Frankfurter parted company with the more progressive vi-
sion of his fellow New Deal appointees, who were more willing to 
trust administrative expertise. The dispute was sometimes phrased 
as respect for administrative processes and sometimes as a respect 
for the trial court, but whatever the formulation, Frankfurter-who 
had been expected to be "the leader of the liberal wing" of the 
Court234-found himself increasingly isolated from what he per-
ceived as a politically motivated coalition led by Black and Doug-
las.235 
233 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emer-
gence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 417-21 (2007) (de-
scribing Professor Frankfurter's views on the need for judicial deference to adminis-
trative experts). There are suggestions in Frankfurter's writing, however, of the 
importance that he placed on judicial review of agency action. Frankfurter laid the 
blame for the evils of the industry with the investment bankers. Felix Frankfurter, su-
pra note 100, at 157-58 ("[T]he power which must more and more be lodged in ad-
ministrative experts, like all power, is prone to abuse unless its exercise is properly 
circumscribed and zealously scrutinized. For we have greatly widened the field of ad-
ministrative discretion and thus opened the doors to arbitrariness."). 
234 Rauh, supra note 29, at 64 ("When Felix went on the bench in January 1939 he 
had such stature as a professor, and adviser to Presidents, an articulate writer, and a 
liberal that he was assumed to be the leader of the liberal wing."). 
235 The split-and Frankfurter's eroding influence-may have had its roots in other 
areas. The first tensions in the New Deal bloc began to surface in the Flag Salute 
cases. In the first of these cases, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 
600 (1940), Frankfurter wrote for an eight-Justice majority upholding a Pennsylvania 
law requiring school children to salute the American flag. Soon thereafter, however, 
Frankfurter felt his leadership position slipping away. Hirsch, supra note 17, at 155. 
This unexpected development embittered him: by the end of the 1942 term, Frank-
furter had the 
sense of being under siege. Unexpectedly, he found himself in a position of be-
ing in opposition; his leadership had been rejected. He would react in a manner 
that had become a familiar part of his psychological makeup. The reaction 
would be particularly bitter, for this time his opponents were former allies; the 
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A. The Rule of Experts vs. Judicial Review 
The split between Frankfurter and his progressive colleagues in 
the field of securities law is most dramatically seen in the two 
Chenery decisions, now bedrocks of administrative law. The first 
came to the Supreme Court in the fall of 1942. Chenery /,236 with 
Frankfurter writing for a slim majority, marked the SEC's first sig-
nificant setback in the Supreme Court since Jones.231 The case is 
also notable as the Court's first brush with insider trading under 
the federal securities laws. By looking to the common law as the 
basis for any insider trading ban, it foreshadows the Court's forays 
a generation later into the question of insider trading, when it 
again relied on common law concepts of fiduciary duty and fraud.238 
challenge was in a domain where he had every reason to anticipate complete 
success; and he had no choice but to remain where he was and fight it out. 
Id. at 176. The erosion of his influence became quite obvious when Gobitis was over-
ruled only three years after being handed down by West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Frankfurter was angered by the switch of 
Black, Douglas, and Murphy and appalled by what he saw as their political motiva-
tion. Edward F. Prichard, Jr., Clerks of the Court on the Justices, in The Making of 
the New Deal: The Insiders Speak, supra note 29, at 47-71 ("Frankfurter .... had 
great contempt for Murphy, Black, and Douglas, because they voted with him in the 
first case and then changed their minds. He always said he didn't believe they had re-
read the Constitution, they had just read the newspapers."); Rauh, supra note 29, at 
64 ("When Frankfurter asked Douglas whether Hugo Black had any new insight into 
the case, Douglas said, 'No, but he's read the papers.' Felix thought that was terri-
ble!"). Whatever motivated the Progressive trio to switch, Frankfurter's leadership 
role on the Court had quite publicly disappeared with the Flag Salute cases. See 
Hirsch, supra note 17, at 155 ("The term that began the fall of 1941 was a turning 
point. The liberal trio solidified in its opposition to Frankfurter, and personnel 
changes brought a new unsettledness to inter-Court relations. Suddenly, Frankfurter 
found himself watching a calm Court, amenable to his influence and leadership, slip 
away from him."). 
236 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
237 The vote was 4-3 with Jackson, Roberts and Stone joining Frankfurter's majority; 
Douglas was not participating as usual and Rutledge had not yet taken Byrnes' seat. 
238 See generally A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice 
Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13 (1998) (detailing 
Powell's reliance on common law concepts in insider trading cases). Jackson, in a let-
ter to Frankfurter two days before the decision was released, suggested that the in-
sider trading may well have helped the shareholders, a view that was also to appear in 
later debates about insider trading. He argued that "if, as is frequently the case, they 
were selling under compulsion, the bids of these directors may well have sustained 
their market, and they may well have benefited therefrom as against the terms they 
must have accepted in the absence of such bids." Letter from Justice Robert H. Jack-
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The alleged insider traders were officers, directors, and control-
ling stockholders of the Federal Water Service Corporation, who 
had acquired preferred stock in Federal during the course of a 
PUHCA reorganization.239 As Frankfurter characterized the rule of 
decision applied by the SEC, "respondents, as Federal's managers, 
were fiduciaries and hence under a 'duty of fair dealing' not to 
trade in the securities of the corporation while plans for its reor-
ganization were before the Commission."240 As a sanction for the 
violation of that duty, the SEC refused· to approve a plan put for-
ward by the company that called for their preferred stock to be 
converted into common stock in the reorganized entity, thus de-
priving the managers of their gains from trading.241 
The SEC's invocation of the term "fiduciary" provoked a now 
well known lecture from Frankfurter on legal reasoning: 
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives 
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What ob-
ligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed 
to discharge those obligations? And what are the consequences 
of his deviation from duty?242 
Frankfurter, of course, knew the answers to these questions; the 
SEC had failed in its analysis. Frankfurter did not need to defer to 
the SEC as the expert on questions of corporate and securities law; 
he was the expert! In Frankfurter's view, an important principle of 
administrative law was at stake: the agency needed to be forthright 
with respect to the basis of its determination in order for the court 
to discharge its review function.243 Here the SEC made a strategic 
error: it had not found that the insiders "acted covertly or traded 
on inside knowledge," but nonetheless found that they had vio-
lated "broad equitable principles" recognized in earlier judicial de-
cisions.244 Its reliance on earlier judicial decisions meant that it 
son to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 30, 1943) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Col-
lection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 1, Reel 7). 
239 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81-82. 
240 Id. at 85. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 85-86. 
243 This is clearly set out in Frankfurter's exchange with Reed just prior to the issu-
ance of the Chenery I decision. See infra notes 252-261 and accompanying text. 
244 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 86-87. 
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could also be constrained by those decisions, which Frankfurter 
then proceeded to distinguish as inapposite. 
The SEC would not necessarily be bound by these precedents, 
Frankfurter conceded, had the agency promulgated new rules re-
flecting its experience gained in working with the statute: "Con-
gress certainly did not mean to preclude the formulation by the 
Commission of standards expressing a more sensitive regard for 
what is right and what is wrong than those prevalent at the time the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 became law."245 But 
having "professed to decide that case before it according to settled 
judicial doctrines, its action must be judged by [those] stan-
dards .... "246 Having dismantled the Commission's reasoning de-
rived from fiduciary duty, Frankfurter blocked any rescue based on 
judicially supplied alternatives by announcing the bedrock princi-
ple for which Chenery I is known in administrative law: "[A]n ad-
ministrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which 
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its 
action can be sustained. "247 
Frankfurter's opinion broached another core issue of administra-
tive law in suggesting an agency would be afforded greater free-
245 Id. at 89. Indeed, Frankfurter favored more demanding standards for fiduciaries. 
See Felix Frankfurter, Social Issues before the Supreme Court (1933), reprinted in 
Law and Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter, supra note 138, at 48, 50 
("[T]he law must become more sophisticated in its conception of trustees' obligations. 
It must sharpen and extend the duties incident to the fiduciary relations of corporate 
directors and officers."). 
246 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 89. 
247 Id. at 95. For a discussion of this principle and the explanations that have been 
given for it, see Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 Yale 
L.J. 952 (2007) (arguing that Chenery I is best explained by the nondelegation doc-
trine). This bedrock principle of administrative law may not have had the strongest of 
foundations. Jackson, the fourth vote in a 4-3 decision, had written a draft concur-
rence in which he said, "where the administrative order depends upon legal grounds I 
should think it our duty to sustain an order that is right on correct legal principles 
even if the administrative body has assigned incorrect ones." Draft Concurrence of 
Justice Jackson, SEC v. Chenery Corp., No. 254, October Term, 1942, at 1 (on file 
with the Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Library of Congress, Box 126). Nevertheless, 
Jackson joined the four-Justice majority without a separate concurrence. 
Jackson's more fundamental legal point in the draft concurrence was that the SE C's 
order was unsustainable because the insiders had not received notice that their con-
duct was illegal: "Surprise law is sometimes inevitable, but it seems almost bromidic 
to say that citizens are entitled to have some way of learning the general principles 
that they will suffer in person or property for transgressing." Id. at 6. 
2009] Securities Law and the New Deal Justices 897 
dom in rulemaking than in formal adjudication. He suggested a 
willingness to defer to the SEC's "experience and insight" accumu-
lated through its involvement in reorganization proceedings, but 
hinted that deference would only be given if the SEC "promul-
gated a general rule" proscribing the conduct in question.248 Indeed, 
in an earlier draft of the opinion, Frankfurter had gone further to 
suggest that deference to the agency rule-making authority re-
quired the invalidation of its administrative order if it had not pre-
viously adopted a rule.249 
Here was the dividing line between Frankfurter and his more 
liberal colleagues. Black's dissent, joined by Murphy and Reed, re-
jected "[t]he intimation ... that the Commission can act only 
248 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 92. Chief Justice Stone suggested a more explicit endorse-
ment of rulemaking by the SEC was in order. Handwritten Note from Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone to Justice Felix Frankfurter (undated) (on file with the Felix 
Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 1, Reel 7). Frankfurter 
demurred: 
Of course I agree with you that had the SEC summarized their experience by 
putting the specific ruling in the Chenery case into a generalized rule, a totally 
different situation would have been created. But I thought it wiser to indicate 
that by innuendo rather than explicitly. To do the latter might be read by the 
Commission as a broad hint from us to issue a regulation. Thereby we would be 
stimulating new problems. 
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Jan. 23, 
1943) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, 
Part 1, Reel 7). 
249 Draft Opinion, SEC v. Chenery Corp., at 8-9 (undated) (on file with the Hugo 
Black Papers, Library of Congress, Box 270) ("But whether it is 'necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers' that a 
general rule or regulation be adopted to prohibit reorganization managers from par-
ticipating equally with others with respect to stock acquired by them during the 
course of the reorganization is for the Commission to determine. Where an adminis-
trative order is valid only if it rests upon a determination which the agency alone is 
authorized to make, its failure to make such a determination cannot be remedied by 
the fact that the agency might properly have made such a determination. It is not for 
us to determine independently what is 'detrimental to the public interest or the inter-
est of investors or consumers' or 'fair and equitable' within the meaning of §§ 7 and 
11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935."). 
In his final opinion, Frankfurter merely asserted that, 
[B]efore transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied their usual 
business consequences, they must fall under the ban of some standards of con-
duct prescribed by an agency of government authorized to prescribe such stan-
dards--either the courts or Congress or an agency to which Congress has dele-
gated its authority. 
Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 92-93. 
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through general formulae rigidly adhered to."250 In Black's view, 
PUHCA gave the SEC "wide powers to evolve policy standards, 
and this may well be done case by case."251 Black's position would 
prevail in Chenery II and give rise to a second bedrock principle of 
administrative law. 
Frankfurter's commitment to judicial review was diametrically 
opposed by Black's commitment to administrative discretion. 
Frankfurter's difference with the dissenters is more starkly visible 
in correspondence between Frankfurter and Reed leading up to is-
suance of majority and minority opinions. Frankfurter had been 
courting Reed since his appointment to the Court-with some suc-
cess252 -but Frankfurter could not hold back his impatience with 
Reed for having joined Black's opinion. 
Were I still at Cambridge I would be saddened to note that you 
underwrote an opinion like Black's dissent in the Chenery case. I 
don't think I should be less saddened because I am your col-
league. I hate to see you "bogged down in the quagmire" of 
Populist rhetoric unrelated to fact. 253 
This condescending introduction-so typical of Frankfurter in 
his relations with his colleagues-was merely the preface of an ex-
tended explication by Frankfurter on the distinction between the 
fiduciary duties of corporate directors and trustees and, more im-
portantly, Frankfurter's views on administrative law. Frankfurter 
conceded that the SEC had the authority to depart from the com-
mon law rule, but in his view, the agency "made the purest kind of 
an ad hoc decision without any reason whatever for its conclusion 
except that these respondents were reorganization managers."254 
The Commission's conclusion "affords no possible basis for a re-
viewing court to say that that which the Commission did was right. 
And so the case must be remanded to the Commission unless court 
review simply means rubber stamping what the Commission 
25° Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 99 (Black, J., dissenting). 
251 Id. at 100. 
2.
12 See Fassett, supra note 140, at 347 (noting that, over the course of the 1942 and 
1943 terms, Reed voted most frequently with Frankfurter). 
253 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Stanley Reed, at 1 (Jan. 29, 1943) 
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 1, 
Reel 7). 
254 Id. at 2. 
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does."255 Frankfurter urged that the standards he expected from the 
SEC and other administrative agencies were essential to their long 
term viability: 
Administrative agencies have two major functions. They exercise 
delegated legislation through their rule-making power, that is, 
they formulate general standards of conduct based on their ex-
perience and their expertness. The broadest leeway should be 
given to them in the exercise of this legislative function. Sec-
ondly, they exercise an adjudicatory function in disposing of spe-
cific controversies that come before them, much as courts would 
do if the jurisdiction in these matters were given to them. The 
Chenery case is such an exercise of the administrative adjudica-
tory process. And it is subject, therefore, to the requirement that 
the reviewing courts be enabled to know the basis of the deter-
mination of the administrative [sic] in order to discharge the 
court's function of review. I have spent most of my professional 
life in trying to get recognition for the indispensability of the ad-
ministrative process. I do not want slipshodness and, still worse, 
lust for power[, to] lead to curtailment of these administrative 
powers by determinations without reason or by appeals to rules 
of law for which there is no warrant.256 
Frankfurter believed passionately in the administrative state-
but he was equally fervent in his belief that the rule of law must 
apply to administrative agencies. Those values would be enforced 
by judges, if necessary. Frankfurter had devoted much of his career 
to arguing for the proposition that courts should not rely on the 
Constitution to interfere with economic regulation by legisla-
tures.257 He did not equally believe in judicial restraint, however, 
when it came to holding administrative agencies to statutory stan-
dards. They were required to follow the rules set down for them by 
the legislature. 
2.1i Id. at 3. 
116 Id. at 3-4. 
117 See Felix Frankfurter, Does Law Obstruct Government?, in The Public & Its 
Government, supra note 100, at 36, 47 (expressing dismay at Supreme Court's increas-
ing tendency to strike down economic regulation: "And always by a divided Court, 
always over the protest of its most distinguished minds!"). 
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Frankfurter's positioning of himself as the defender of the rule 
of law was calculated to annoy his colleagues. Reed by this time 
had grown tired of the professor's lectures and he believed that 
agencies should be given much broader latitude. In his reply, Reed 
argued that "[y]ou [Frankfurter] say the Commission from its ex-
perience may fashion a new 'general' rule of conduct. I say, it has 
done just that. ... [I]t said that fiduciary reorganization managers 
may not deal in stock of companies being reorganized." 258 In Reed's 
view, the SEC was not required to promulgate a formal rule: "A 
few such ad hoc decisions will result in a regulation-that is the 
way regulations grow."259 Reed was content to leave the SEC con-
siderable space in which to grow its regulations: 
Every decision must be an ad hoc ruling, as I see it. An applica-
tion of the Commission's idea as to "fair and equitable." Such 
application should be guided by precedents and regulations but 
may depart from them. If it does not go too far (arbitrary, capri-
cious and unreasonable), it should be upheld. This is the essence 
of administrative law.260 
Reed's incremental vision of administrative lawmaking, in stark 
contrast to Frankfurter's, required very little involvement from 
courts; indeed, it mirrored the rulemaking process of common law 
courts. Reed's position was the one that would ultimately prevail in 
the New Deal Court's approach to securities law.261 
In between the time Chenery was remanded to the SEC in 1943 
and its return in 1946, the divisions that had begun to develop 
among the Justices had devolved into open warfare. Jurispruden-
tial differences were now exacerbated by intense personal animos-
ity. The tensions on the Court flared with the retirement of Rob-
erts in the summer of 1945. Black refused to sign the customary 
258 Letter from Justice Stanley Reed to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 29, 1943) (on 




261 The SEC, for its part, ameliorated some of the surprise element of its pro-
nouncements by making liberal use of informal guidance, a practice that has devel-
oped into its current "No Action" letters. See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regu-
lation 215 (1984) (discussing the SEC's use of General Counsel opinions to elucidate 
its views on the securities laws). 
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letter from the Justices thanking him for his services, and Stone's 
best efforts were unable to broker a compromise.262 The result was 
a very ungracious departure for the last of the old guard. 
These resentments spilled into public view when Chief Justice 
Stone died on April 22, 1946. Five of the sitting associate Justices 
would have been delighted to be elevated to the center seat,263 with 
Douglas actively campaigning for the seat (and Corcoran assisting 
behind the scenes).264 Black and Jackson, however, were the pri-
mary contenders, with Jackson having been promised the spot by 
Roosevelt before his death.265 The Washington scuttlebutt was that 
neither would be willing to serve under the other.266 Moreover, 
Drew Pearson wrote in his prominent column that two members of 
the Court (implicitly, Black and Douglas), had threatened to resign 
if Jackson were made Chief Justice.267 In an effort to avoid the 
ramifications of choosing between Black and Jackson, Truman in-
stead appointed his Secretary of the Treasury, Fred Vinson. Tru-
man's desire to keep the peace on the Court was not entirely suc-
cessful; Jackson, bitter at having been passed over, sent a cable to 
the President and letters to the congressional judiciary committees 
denouncing Black for having declined to recuse himself in a case 
involving a former law partner.268 
Thus, it was a Court with extremely frayed personal relations 
that heard Chenery when the case returned in the October 1946 
term. The SEC had responded to the Court's earlier remand by 
reaching the same result, basing it on a different rationale. Frank-
furter complained to Black: 
With every impulse to sustain the Commission, ... I cannot es-
cape the conviction that the Commission has decided this case ad 
262 Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 95, 98 (1999). 
263 Fassett, supra note 140, at 405 (noting that, on Stone's death, "it is quite clear that 
five of the associate justices each seriously aspired to, or at least would wholeheart-
edly have welcomed, becoming chief justice"). 
264 See Ferren, supra note 91, at 326. 
265 See id. at 325. 
266 Murphy, supra note 127, at 244. 
261 Id. 
268 Cable from Justice Robert H. Jackson to President Harry Truman (June 8, 1946), 
discussed in Melvin I. Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court Under 
Stone and Vinson 1941-1953, at 143-44 (1997). The case was Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. 
v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S.161 (1945). 
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hoc without any reference to considerations that would govern it 
in the same case tomorrow .... 
. . . The SEC is not a Kadi sitting under a tree, dispensing 
judgment in each case, unrelated to general considerations.269 
Chenery I presented two possible separate strands of administra-
tive law and judicial review. One focused on the importance of the 
courts being able to review the reasons stated by an administrative 
agency in an adjudication; the other suggested administrative ac-
tion done by rule-making would enjoy less intrusive judicial review. 
Chenery I was ambiguous as to which administrative law message 
would control going forward. 210 
In Chenery II, Murphy, Black, and Reed, who had dissented in 
Chenery I, were now joined by new Justices Wiley Rutledge and 
Harold Burton to form a majority upholding the SEC's action. This 
majority explicitly rejected Frankfurter's suggestion in Chenery I 
that the agency should proceed by rulemaking: "[T]he choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litiga-
tion is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the ad-
ministrative agency"211-a holding that endures as a core principle 
of modern administrative law. Only Jackson joined Frankfurter in 
voting to overturn the SEC's decision.212 The Court was now com-
mitted to deference to agency discretion; Frankfurter's concerns 
about judicial review of the agency performing an adjudicatory 
function were brushed aside. 
Frankfurter circulated a dissent that threatened another public 
blow-up. The case was argued in December and assigned to Bur-
ton, but it was reassigned to Murphy in early June273 because Bur-
ton had not been able to produce an opinion and Murphy had 
269 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Hugo Black (Dec. 23, 1946) (on 
file with the Robert Jackson Collection, Library of Congress, Box 138). The "Kadi" 
reference made its way into a published dissent a few years later. See Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("This is a court of review, 
not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing 
justice according to considerations of individual expediency."). 
270 We thank Kevin Stack for pointing out this difference. 
271 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
272 Douglas, as usual, had recused himself. Chief Justice Vinson did not participate. 
Id. at 209. 
273 James E. St. Clair & Linda C. Gugin, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky: 
A Political Biography 180 (2002). 
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completed all of his opinions for the term.274 Murphy's law clerk 
scrambled to draft an opinion in about a week's time.275 Frankfurter 
did not have time for a full-blown dissent at that late point in the 
term, so he circulated a draft dissent: "The Court's opinion in this 
case was not circulated until Tuesday, June 17th. Obviously that 
precluded opportunity before adjournment for the preparation, 
printing, circulation and consideration by the whole Court of a re-
sponse adequate to the issues raised by the opinion."276 Frank-
furter's inartful choice of language provoked a gentle scolding from 
Rutledge for "disclos[ing] the confidential routines of the Court."277 
Moreover, Rutledge felt that Frankfurter's opinion put Murphy in 
a bad light: "[Murphy] will appear, if your circulation goes down, in 
the light of having caused all the delay. I do not think [that] impli-
cation is fair ... . "218 Frankfurter responded by deleting the refer-
ence to the date of circulation, instead attributing his failure to 
publish a full dissent to the "unavoidable lateness of the deci-
sion. "279 Frankfurter's second choice of words fared little better, 
provoking an angry response from Murphy: 
I am asking Justice Frankfurter to delete all reference in his re-
marks to the "unavoidable lateness of the decision in this case." 
So far as the public is concerned, any decision rendered in the 
same term as that in which the case is argued is not "unavoid-
ably" late. It is not unknown for cases to be argued early and de-
cided late in the term. To say that such a decision is "unavoid-
274 Telephone Interview with Eugene Gressman, Law Clerk to Justice Frank Mur-
phv 1943-48 (Sept. 6, 2008) (notes on file with the authors). 
2,i Id. 
276 Justice Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum to the Conference in Nos. 81 and 82, 
Oct. Term, 1946 (June 23, 1947) (on file with the Hugo Black Collection, Library of 
Congress, Box 283). 
277 Letter from Justice Wiley Rutledge to Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 18, 1947) 
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 3, 
Reel 3). 
278 Id. Rutledge was sufficiently distressed by Frankfurter's opinion that he wrote a 
draft concurrence exonerating Murphy of any blame for the lateness of the opinion. 
Draft Concurrence of Justice Rutledge, SEC v. Chenery Corp., Nos. 81 and 82, Oct. 
Term, 1946 (June 23, 1947) (on file with the Wiley Rutledge Collection, Library of 
Congress, Box 155). 
279 Justice Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum to the Conference in Nos. 81 and 82 
(June 18, 1947) (on file with the Wiley Rutledge Collection, Library of Congress, Box 
155). 
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ably" late is thus to stir up needless speculation and comment by 
the public.280 
A chastised Frankfurter attempted to apologize: 
It must be due to naivete that it never occurred to me that the 
simple statement of an obvious fact could ever be deemed a de-
parture, however remote, from the Court's tradition, or that it 
would touch anybody's sensitiveness .... 
I am sorry even if unwittingly I should have touched the sensi-
bilities of any of my brethren. In any event, long before the 
memorandum by brother Murphy reached me, I sent a revised 
phrasing of my notice of dissent to the printer. It says precisely 
what I believe it is appropriate to say, and says it in a way that 
does not, so far as I am able to judge, lend itself even to tortured 
• • • 281 m1smterpretation. 
Frankfurter had a rare gift, allowing him to offend-with his refer-
ence to "tortured misinterpretation"-even in the course of an at-
tempted apology. His actual opinion, however, was inoffensive.282 
It was Jackson, however, who took on the task of writing the full 
dissent for Frankfurter and himself. His dissent is a sarcastic attack 
(characterized by Frankfurter as a "rip-snorter"283) on the Court's 
reasoning and the SEC's lawlessness. "The Court's reasoning adds 
up to this: The Commission must be sustained because of its accu-
mulated experience in solving a problem with which it had never 
before been confronted!"284 Jackson's strident tone provoked an 
anxious memorandum from Vinson's law clerk, who worried that 
"it includes such ridicule of the majority position as possibly to in-
timate lack of integrity when applied to the product of able 
minds .... In view of publicity recently given to 'feuds' within the 
280 Justice Frank Murphy, Memorandum to the Conference (June 18, 1947) (on file 
with the Hugo Black Collection, Library of Congress, Box 283). 
281 Justice Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Conference Nos. 81 and 82 (June 
18, 1947) (on file with the Hugo Black Collection, Library of Congress, Box 281). 
282 Letter from Justice Frank Murphy to Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 18, 1947) 
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Part 1, 
Reel 17) ("Thanks for your last circulation in the Chenery case. It is entirely satisfac-
tory to me now."). 
283 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson (July 23, 
(1947)) (on file with the Robert Jackson Collection, Library of Congress, Box 138). 
284 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 213 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Court, I think the opinion may invite newspaper attention .... "285 
The clerk's concern was justified; the newspaper headlines read 
"Jackson Says High Court Encourages Lawlessness."286 
Jackson scored polemical points, but Frankfurter passed up an 
opportunity to flesh out his vision of the rule of law in the adminis-
trative state. In the months before Chenery II was decided, Con-
gress finally passed the Administrative Procedure Act, a project 
long delayed because of the war effort, and in doing provided a 
partial response to Frankfurter's earlier concerns. The new statute 
imposed additional requirements of "substantial evidence" and ju-
dicial restraint of "arbitrary" and "capricious" actions,287 and 
sought to reverse what Congress may have perceived as "overly 
deferential judicial examination of agency factfinding."288 The Act 
itself reflected something of a political compromise,289 with the 
most restrictive and detailed provisions applicable to formal adju-
dications, leaving rulemaking with less intrusive and vague provi-
sions.290 Over time administrative law would move further in Frank-
furter's direction. Judicial deference to administrative expertise 
may have already begun to recede from its high point by the time 
285 Memo on dissenting opinion in S.E.C. v. Chenery from JT to Chief Justice Fred 
Vinson (Oct. 4, 1947) (on file with the Fred Vinson Collection, University of Ken-
tucky). 
286 Jackson Says High Court Encourages Lawlessness, Minneapolis Morning Trib-
une, Oct. 7, 1947, at 2 (newspaper clipping on file with the Robert Jackson Collection, 
Library of Congress, Box 138). 
m See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701--06 (2000). 
288 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1383, 1427 (2004). 
289 On the long struggle by conservatives to rein in the New Deal agencies, see 
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996). 
290 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Col um. 
L. Rev. 1749, 1756 (2007) (describing how "New Deal Democrats fought to unleash 
agencies from rigid procedural control, while Republicans pushed in the opposite di-
rection, particularly in the context of adjudication, which was a prevalent form of 
agency decisionmaking at the time"). 
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of Chenery Il. 291 At no point, however, would the Court require an 
agency to proceed through rulemaking.292 
A similar division over the intensity of judicial review of SEC ac-
tion is visible in two other decisions of this period (and one non-
decision). Otis & Co. v. SEC,293 decided between the two Chenery 
cases, arose from the liquidation of a holding company in which the 
SEC declined to apply a liquidation preference for preferred 
shareholders contained in the holding company's charter. Applying 
the preference would have had the effect of giving all of the equity 
to the preferred shareholders and excluding the common share-
holders entirely.294 In deciding whether such a result was "fair and 
equitable," as required by PUHCA Section 11( e ), Frankfurter fo-
cused on the Court's prior insistence in a bankruptcy proceeding 
that violations of the absolute priority rule among securities hold-
ers were unfair and inequitable.295 As Frankfurter pointed out in a 
letter to Reed, there was little reason for construing the identical 
language "fair and equitable" one way for the Bankruptcy Act, 
adopted in 1934, and another way for PUHCA, adopted in 1935.296 
Chief Justice Stone argued at the Court's conference that affirming 
the SEC would be tantamount to saying that the "Commission is 
291 See Schiller, supra note 233, at 441 ("The profound deference of New Deal-era 
administrative law was not to last Jong, but it firmly defined the role of expertise in 
the administrative state and created the model of judicial deference that would be 
both emulated and reacted against as administrative law developed during the rest of 
the twentieth century." (footnote omitted)). 
292 The bedrock holding of Chenery II as to agency choice would come into question 
after one point after Frankfurter's retirement. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 
759 (1969), suggested "that a doctrine policing agency choice of procedure might be 
on the horizon," Magill, supra note 288 at 1407, but as Professor Magill has devel-
oped, the doctrine thereafter evolved to emphasize the breadth of an agency's discre-
tion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication. See generally id. 
293 323 U.S. 624 (1945). The preference purported to apply to "liquidation of the 
corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary." Id. at 630 n.6 (quoting the United 
Li~ht and Power Company's charter). 
Id. The SEC chose instead to value the preferred stock on a going concern basis 
and awarded a small percentage of the value of the liquidated company to the com-
mon stockholders. Id. at 629-32. 
295 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1939); see also Consol. 
Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 530-31 (1941). 
296 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Stanley Reed (Nov. 21, 1944) (on 
file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 56). 
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God."297 A majority of the Court was persuaded by the SEC's ar-
guments, however, with Stone, Roberts, and Frankfurter dissent-
ing. The Court majority was giving the SEC a clean slate, unen-
cumbered by judicial interpretations of analogous laws. It also 
established a pattern of affording the SEC latitude in valuing the 
interests of securities holders in holding company reorganiza-
tions.298 
American Power II, decided in 1946, reflected both the Court's 
unanimity on questions of constitutional power discussed in the last 
section and its division on the question of judicial review of expert 
decisions.299 Not surprisingly, Murphy's opinion for the Court in 
American Power II tracked his North American opinion of a few 
months earlier with respect to the commerce clause and due proc-
ess challenges. The Court concluded that "the federal commerce 
power is as broad as the economic needs of the nation. "300 Implicit 
in this holding was that it was Congress-not the Court-that 
297 Handwritten Notes from Conference, No. 81, OT 1944 (undated) (on file with the 
Frank Murphy Collection, Bentley Library, University of Michigan, Reel 131). 
298 In SEC v. Cent. Ill. Sec. Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 155 (1949), the Justices were unani-
mous (with Douglas and Jackson not participating) in deferring to the SEC's choice to 
award preferred shareholders the call value of their securities rather than their invol-
untary liquidation value. The Court characterized the "principle of the Otis case ... 
that the measure of equitable equivalence for purposes of simplification proceedings 
compelled by the Holding Company Act is the value of the securities 'on the basis of 
a going business and not as though a liquidation were taking place."' Id. at 131 (cita-
tion omitted). 
Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951), represents the 
complete triumph of administrative expertise over the wisdom of the marketplace. 
There, the Court upheld the SEC's determination to afford no value to outstanding 
stock option warrants, despite the fact that the warrants had no time limit for their 
exercise and were trading for a positive value in the marketplace. The Court deferred 
to the SEC's determination that "there is no ground for a reasonable expectation that, 
within the foreseeable future" the warrants would be in the money. Id. at 344. "Where 
the line is to be drawn is a matter for the expert judgment of the Commission." Id. 
The Court's opinion drew a dissent from the odd couple of Frankfurter and Black, but 
Frankfurter rested his objection on the reasoning of the court below. Id. at 348 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
299 Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC (American Power II), 329 U.S. 90 (1946). The 
case resolved the lingering constitutional issues left after North American at the end 
of the Court's previous term. Under review was the SEC's order breaking up the larg-
est single public utility holding company system registered under the Act. 
300 Id. at 104. 
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would determine the nation's "economic needs."301 The Court hap-
pily ceded broad latitude to agency expertise, emphatically reject-
ing the challenge raised to the Commission's insistence on dissolu-
tion. "[T]he Commission here has accumulated experience and 
knowledge which no court can hope to attain,"302 Murphy wrote. 
The agency's judgment was accorded "greatest weight"; courts 
would intervene only if the agency's action was unwarranted by 
law or without justification in fact.303 
A third case reflecting similar divisions ended up with no pub-
lished opinion after Frankfurter's change of heart erased a majority 
for an opinion that Murphy had been preparing.304 The SEC had 
found Pacific Gas & Electric Company ("PG&E") to be a subsidi-
ary of the North American Company ("North American"), thereby 
subjecting PG&E to regulation as a subsidiary under PUHCA. 
Murphy had no difficulty upholding the SEC's order: "The judicial 
function on review ... ceases when it becomes clear that the infer-
ences and conclusions drawn by the administrative agency have 
'
01 The Court used equally broad strokes in addressing the utility's argument of an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the SEC. "The judicial approval 
accorded these 'broad' standards for administrative action is a reflection of the neces-
sities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems." Id. 
at 104-05. 
302 Id. at 112. 
303 Murphy's broad trust of the agency extended to the SEC's refusal to hold a hear-
ing on the company's alternative plan proposed under§ ll(e) of the act, but here he 
lost the Court's unanimity. Id. at 112, 118. Justice Rutledge wrote separately to say he 
viewed the statue as requiring the Commission to provide for notice and hearing, the 
absence of which would have been grounds for reversal had the companies not effec-
tively waived their rights in this case. Id. at 121-22 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Frank-
furter inserted a written statement as to his belief that the consideration of notice and 
hearing does not arise given the particular circumstances of this case in what he hoped 
would be a message to the agency. Id. at 121 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Frankfurter 
noted his initial opposition to the discussion of the notice issue, and his willingness to 
let it go so that the decision might be unanimous, but. with the filing of Rutledge's 
separate opinion, he sought to pursue the issue: "[This] gives the SEC a hint to recon-
sider fully the proper construction of§ ll(e) and ... leave the matter for future dispo-
sition here by what one has a right to hope may be a full court." Letter from Justice 
Felix Frankfurter to Justice Frank Murphy (Nov. 23, 1946) (on file with the Felix 
Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 52). 
JG< Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 324 U.S. 826 (1945) (per curiam) (affirming judg-
ment below by an equally divided Court). 
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warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law."305 North 
American's ownership of seventeen percent of PG&E's voting se-
curities and representation on PG&E's board were a sufficient ba-
sis for Murphy to conclude that North American controlled 
PG&E, despite the lack of evidence of any influence by North 
American over PG&E's policies.306 Murphy's opinion, however, 
failed to persuade Frankfurter, who switched his earlier vote to 
uphold the SEC's action. He explained to Murphy: 
After much travail I am constrained to conclude that the 
S.E.C. made its decision in the case on unsustainable legal crite-
ria. That they could have reached the same result exclusively on 
their allowable interpretation of the facts, or that they may here-
after reach the same conclusion on such an appraisal of the facts, 
can not from my point of view justify our approval of erroneous 
criteria laid down by the Commission. You see you have edu-
cated me to keep these agencies within the legal bounds pre-
scribed by Congress. This is for me fundamentally another Chen-
• • 307 ery situation. 
Once again, the SEC had not lived up to the exacting standards 
that Frankfurter expected from the agency.308 
Murphy's trust of the experts was sufficiently great that he was 
willing to construe standing narrowly in PUHCA reorganizations 
because of a worry that minority shareholders might harass the 
SEC. The Court majority, however, was not willing to go so far. In 
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC (consolidated with SEC v. 
305 Draft Opinion of Justice Murphy, Pac. Gas and Elec. v. SEC, No. 55, Oct. Term, 
1944, at 6 (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 
52)o0 
Id. at 6-11. 
307 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Frank Murphy (Feb. 22, 1945) (on 
file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 52). · 
308 Murphy was not happy with Frankfurter's switch, as it deprived him of his major-
ity, and with Douglas recused as usual, the SEC's action would be upheld by an 
equally divided court, rendering Murphy's "many long hours . . . spent on the 
P.G.&E. opinion" a waste. Letter from Justice Frank Murphy to Justice Felix Frank-
furter (Feb. 23, 1945) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Con-
gress, Reel 52). Murphy was prepared to write that off, but he was more impatient 
with Frankfurter's explanation (or lack thereof) for his switch: "I am ... at a loss to 
know what it is that has made you change your mind. If, as you say, it is the erroneous 
criteria used by the SEC, I ask you to reread my opinion and tell me what you think is 
wrong." Id. 
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Okin),309 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that Section 
24(a)310 conferred standing on: (1) American Power & Light, as the 
sole stockholder of Florida Power & Light Company, to challenge 
an order by the SEC "requir[ing] Florida to make certain account-
ing entries which will result in taking out of surplus moneys which 
would otherwise be available to pay dividends to [American 
Power],"311 and (2) Samuel Okin, a small shareholder in Electric 
Bond & Share Company, who sought to challenge a loan from 
Electric Bond & Share to its subsidiary, American and Foreign 
Power Company.312 The Court announced a broad standard for 
those seeking review that ignored formal distinctions between di-
rect and derivative claims: "a stockholder having a substantial fi-
nancial or economic interest from that of the corporation which is 
directly and adversely affected by an order of the Commission, ir-
respective of any effect the order may have on the corporation, is a 
'person aggrieved' within the meaning of§ 24(a)."313 Murphy, anx-
ious to avoid interference with the administrative process, dis-
sented, arguing that if American's "remote economic interest" was 
sufficient to confer standing, "there is no limit to which minority 
stockholders may harass the Commission and their respective cor-
porations by challenging orders of the Commission directed to the 
• ,,314 corporations. 
309 Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC (American Power !), 325 U.S. 385, 386 & n.1 
(1945). 
310 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1940). 
311 American Power I, 325 U.S. at 386-88. 
312 Id. at 392 (noting that Okin challenged the loan as illegal and fraudulent, not-
withstanding its approval by the SEC). 
313 Id. at 388. 
314 Id. at 396 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Murphy's concern about the efficiency of the 
administrative process here is a little difficult to square with his position in In re Elec-
tric Power & Light Corp., in which he joined Frankfurter in dissenting from the denial 
of stay of execution of a plan of dissolution pending appeal. 337 U.S. 903, 904 (1949) 
(per curiam) (Frankfurter & Murphy, JJ., dissenting). 
Murphy was also skeptical of Okin's claim of fraud. "Such frivolous claims of fraud 
are insufficient to warrant making an exception to the general rule that a stockholder 
cannot appeal an administrative order which involves only the corporation as such." 
American Power I, 325 U.S. at 398 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
Murphy was joined by Black and Reed in arguing to deny standing to American 
Power, a holding company, but not in reaching the same conclusion with respect to 
Okin, a small investor. Black, ever the champion of the underdog, expressed concern 
"that courts should not put insuperable obstacles in the way of stockholders whose 
interests might be sacrificed by management." Letter from Justice Hugo Black to Jus-
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Although the Court read Section 24(a) broadly in American 
Power, it subsequently gave the SEC some control over where a 
challenge could be brought. In General Protective Committee for 
Holders of Option Warrants of United Corp. v. SEC, 315 the Court 
held that the district court, rather than the court of appeals, had ju-
risdiction over elements of the plan of reorganization that the SEC 
made subject to approval by the district court in an enforcement 
proceeding. The case was unanimous, notable only in that it was 
Douglas's first opinion in a PUHCA case, almost fifteen years after 
he left the SEC.316 
Douglas again wrote for the Court a year later when the Court 
upheld the reservation of jurisdiction of the SEC to pass on the 
reasonableness and allocation of fees and expenses paid to under-
writers in connection with the reorganization of Electric Bond & 
Share.311 Douglas surely drew from experience when he wrote: 
Payment of excessive fees was one of the historic abuses of the 
reorganization procedure whereby utility companies were 
milked, an abuse the Public Utility Holding Company Act sought 
to correct. ... 
. . . Congress had before it the detailed record of holding com-
pany activities and knew that many of them had a proclivity for 
predatory practices. The fees were not only large; they were of-
ten loaded on affiliated companies and concealed in intrasystem 
accounts.318 
SEC oversight was essential to eliminate those abuses, in Douglas's 
view. Douglas had now-belatedly-placed himself with the 
Court's majority in giving the SEC free rein. 
tice Frank Murphy (May 30, 1945) (on file with the Frank Murphy Collection, Bentley 
Library, University of Michigan). 
315 346 U.S. 521 (1954). 
316 The Court was more generous to the SEC's interest in finality in SEC v. Louisi-
ana Public Service Comm'n, 353 U.S. 368, 372 (1957) (per curiam), in which it held 
that a decision by the SEC not to reopen a prior proceeding was not subject to review 
in the court of appeals. The decision attracted little interest from the Justices; it was 
decided in a short per curiam by Whitaker. See Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren 
to Justice Charles Evans Whitaker (May 9, 1957) (on file with the Earl Warren Pa-
pers, Library of Congress, Box 633). 
317 SEC v. Drexel & Co., 348 U.S. 341 (1955). 
318 Id. at 348-49 (footnote omitted). 
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Frankfurter again found himself in dissent, this time joined by 
Burton.319 Frankfurter was fighting a lonely fight to keep the SEC 
to what he saw as the letter of the law that he had helped to enact. 
A majority of the Court was consistently willing to afford the 
agency latitude to fight the abuses that had led to the adoption of 
the federal securities laws. 
IV. A RELIABLE COURT 
From a twenty-first century perspective, perhaps the most strik-
ing feature of the New Deal Court's work in the field of securities 
law is how reliable the Court was in accomplishing Roosevelt's 
agenda-there were no surprises for the President. The intervening 
decades have seen a number of appointments that have caused 
Presidents to regret their choices. Roosevelt's nominees gave him 
no cause for similar regret, at least in the field of securities law, a 
legislative priority for the Roosevelt administration. The New Deal 
Court delivered in validating political control over finance. 
Why was there such a consistent pattern of deference to the 
SEC? No individual Justice was leading the fight for the SEC. The 
two Justices who might have led the Court based on their deep ex-
perience in the area, Frankfurter and Douglas, exercised very little 
influence. Murphy, largely by default, ended up with a recurring 
role. Given his lack of experience in the area and the low regard 
that his brethren had for his abilities, it is difficult to say that he 
dramatically shaped the jurisprudence or led the Court in this area. 
Rather, his opinions reflect a broad consensus-based on similar 
experiences that the New Deal Justices brought to the Court-that 
judges should defer to the SEC. 
319 Frankfurter wrote: 
Congress effectively equipped the Commission with power to regulate fees in 
the various proceedings which required approval by the Commission. But Con-
gress particularized. It did not vest this fee-fixing authority of the Commission 
in a comprehensive provision. It dealt with the problem distributively. It was 
explicit in relating the power to fix fees to the particular proceeding. 
The [Public Utility] Holding Company Act of 1935 is a reticulated statute, not 
a hodge-podge. To observe its explicit provisions is to respect the purpose of 
Congress and the care with which it was formulated. 
Id. at 349-50 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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A. Reliability 
Over the last half century, Presidents regularly have set out to 
mold the Supreme Court to implement the administration's goals, 
with varying degrees of success. For Franklin Roosevelt, the chal-
lenge was more salient than for his successors because he initially 
faced a Court that was perceived to be hostile to the New Deal 
agenda. The eight men Roosevelt named to the Court each ac-
cepted Roosevelt's new role for government in the nation's econ-
omy. Stone's elevation to Chief Justice was no exception to this 
pattern; although a Republican holdover, he shared his new col-
leagues' belief in judicial deference to political control over fi-
nance. Collectively, Roosevelt's appointments produced a Court 
that quickly abandoned the old Court's inclination to strike down 
New Deal initiatives. The Court boldly announced its willingness 
to give Congress and the administration a wide berth in economic 
regulation. That well known and lasting legacy of deference has 
continued to this day. 
Less well known is the New Deal Court's deference to the SEC 
as it asserted governmental control over finance, displacing broad 
areas of private ordering that had previously dominated the field. 
After the Jones case in 1936, it was almost four decades before the 
Supreme Court made any concerted effort to rein in the SEC and 
the reach of the securities laws. Frankfurter found no consistent 
support in his effort to bring judicial scrutiny to bear on the agency. 
The forty years after Jones saw a string of three dozen outcomes 
supportive of the agency and an expansive view of securities laws, 
interrupted only sporadically by a restrictive decision.320 
In retrospect, Roosevelt's triumph with the New Deal Court in 
the field of securities law is all the more impressive in light of the 
subsequent political repudiation of his administration's two most 
expansive governmental intrusions into business. PUHCA and the 
Chandler Act are all but invisible to modem securities lawyers. 
PUHCA, which allowed the SEC to dictate corporate governance 
standards to an industry vital to the economy, faded in importance 
as all of the nation's public utility holding companies were broken 
up by the 1950s. A generation later, narrow interpretations and 
regulatory exemptions undid much of the work accomplished by 
320 Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 12, at 1580. 
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the SEC in breaking up the holding companies. New utility con-
glomerates emerged, such as Enron, with diverse business interests 
and sprawling operations. PUHCA's purpose-the Brandeisian as-
sault on "bigness"-was largely repudiated, and the Act itself was 
repealed in 2005.321 The Chandler Act, which afforded the SEC a 
key role in reorganization plans, was replaced by the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, which did not provide any role for the SEC.322 
The SEC supported the move. As a result of the repeal of these 
two laws, the SEC was deprived of the two roles that gave it an im-
portant say in corporate governance, leaving the agency with the 
disclosure-focused regulation of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act has recently increased the role of the securities 
laws in corporate governance, but its incremental reforms hardly 
portend a move toward federal incorporation like PUHCA and the 
Chandler Act. 
Why did Roosevelt have such success with his appointees? They 
shared several key characteristics. First, most had had prior advo-
cacy positions in the executive branch, which proved to be a reli-
able barometer of a Justice's future leanings. Douglas headed the 
SEC, Murphy served as Attorney General, Jackson as both Solici-
tor General and Attorney General, among other high level posi-
tions, and Reed as general counsel to the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation and then Solicitor General. All enthusiastically en-
dorsed FDR's new role for government in managing the economy 
ravaged by the Great Depression. Black's record in the Senate (in-
cluding his bitter attack on the utility industry) provided a reliable 
predictor of his future judicial attitudes.323 Frankfurter was the most 
skeptical of the Justices toward the SEC, but he never showed any-
thing like the hostility of the Old Guard in Jones. He had served 
briefly in government before undertaking an academic career, and 
his steady informal roles produced at least some bonding effect 
similar to that produced by more formal service in the executive 
branch.324 Only Rutledge came from the appellate court, the typical 
321 See supra note 8. 
322 The story of this evolution and William 0. Douglas's unintentional contribution 
to it is well told by Skeel, supra note 117, at 125-28. 
323 Bymes's Senate service would likely have served as an equally accurate predictor 
of his judicial judgments, had he stayed long enough on the Court to render any. 
324 Notably, Frankfurter disclaimed the title of New Deal Justice: 
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path for modern Justices, after serving as a professor. In short, 
Roosevelt's appointees overwhelmingly bought into the New Deal 
agenda. 
Second, Roosevelt clearly had a "litmus test": he picked nomi-
nees who had already proved their loyalty on the Court-packing 
plan, the fulcrum of the dispute between the administration and 
the "old" Court. Reed helped draft the bill;325 Jackson was a key 
administration witness in the Congressional hearings;326 Black was a 
principal lieutenant to the Senate's majority leader Robinson in 
this debate;327 Byrnes, also a Senator, likewise supported the plan;328 
Douglas quickly enlisted in the administration's efforts to push the 
plan.329 Frankfurter was silent in the face of overwhelming pressure 
to speak against the plan, including from his own wife. His silence 
may have ensured his appointment.330 A willingness to stomach the 
deeply controversial Court-packing plan demonstrated a real 
commitment to constraining judicial power. 
Third, Roosevelt knew his nominees personally. They were 
trusted advisors, both in the strategy for defending the New Deal 
against judicial attack,331 and on the question of whom to add to the 
Court. By and large they were a mutual admiration society before 
their appointment to the Court. Frankfurter and Douglas, who 
would become bitter enemies on the Court, each pushed for the 
I'm incurably academic and cannot rid myself of the conviction that it is of the 
very essence of the function of this Court that when a man comes on it, he 
leaves all party feelings as well as affiliations behind. I certainly do not and have 
not since January 30, 1939 for one split second felt like or deemed myself, or 
deemed it right for anyone else to think of me, as a "New Deal" Justice. 
Copy of Handwritten Note from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Owen Roberts 
(Feb. 4, 1943) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Li-
brary, Part 3, Reel 3). 
325 Lash, supra note 29, at 53; Fassett, supra note 140, at 174 (describing Reed's pub-
lic support). 
326 Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, supra note 188, at 18. 
327 Ferren, supra note 91, at 133-35 (describing a prominent radio address given by 
Black). 
328 Fassett, supra note 140, at 303 (describing support of Byrnes); Leuchtenburg, su-
pra note 144, at 135 (describing support of future Justices Byrnes, Black and Minton 
as senators). 
329 Seligman, supra note l, at 155. 
330 Lash, supra note 29, at 63 ("It is doubtful ... that Roosevelt would have ap-
pointed [Frankfurter] after Cardozo's unexpected death, had he not loyally kept his 
silence [in the court packing fight]."). 
331 See supra Part II. 
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appointment of the other to the Court.332 Jackson pushed for 
Frankfurter's nomination to the Court;333 Jackson and Murphy 
pushed for Douglas;334 Murphy, Black, and Douglas pushed for 
Rutledge,335 although Frankfurter lobbied for Learned Hand;336 
Frankfurter had urged the appointment of Reed as Solicitor Gen-
eral.337 And they did not stop advising the President when they 
were appointed to the Court. Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, and 
Jackson continued to advise the President,338 and Douglas and 
Jackson were known to play poker in the President's game.339 
Fourth, this was not just a politically astute, but a politically am-
bitious, court. The New Deal Supreme Court was like today's U.S. 
Senate: each member believed himself a viable national electoral 
candidate.340 Douglas was active in plotting strategy to seek the vice 
presidency in 1944 and in 1948;341 Black believed his prior Klan as-
sociation knocked him out of the Vice Presidency in 1944;342 Mur-
332 After his appointment, Douglas wrote in his diary: 
I saw Brandeis at his apartment and he told me something which gave me as 
great a thrill as the nomination itself. He said "You were my personal choice for 
my successor." He was most gracious and held my hand with great warmth as 
he said it. I was deeply touched. That, I felt, was the greatest compliment ever 
paid me. Whether he had communicated that thought to the President, I do not 
know. I suspect he had done so, indirectly through Felix who was most anxious 
that I receive the nomination. 
William 0. Douglas, Diary (Mar. 26, 1939) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Box 1780). 
333 Robert H. Jackson, Diary (Jan. 2, 1939) (on file with the Robert H. Jackson Col-
lection, Library of Congress, Box 81); Ferren, supra note 91, at 137. 
334 Ferren, supra note 91, at 151 (describing Jackson's support); J. Woodford How-
ard, Jr., Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography 192 (1968) (describing Murphy's 
sugRort). 
3 Fine, supra note 226, at 194. 
336 Ferren, supra note 91, at 216-17. 
337 Irons, supra note 16, at 12. Frankfurter earlier had asked Reed to find spots for 
Cohen and Corcoran at the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. See Fassett, supra 
note 140, at 54. 
338 Lash, supra note 29, at 77. 
339 Murphy, supra note 127, at 185. 
340 New Deal appointees joined a court that already was more politically deep than 
most. Roberts was rumored as a Republican presidential candidate in 1936 and 
Hughes had resigned from the Court to run for President back in 1916. Leuchtenburg, 
suEra note 144, at 43. 
'Murphy, supra note 127, at 217-30 (discussing 1944); id. at 251-65 (discussing 
1948). 
342 Leuchtenburg, supra note 144, at 207-08. 
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phy, the former Governor of Michigan, retained presidential ambi-
tions after moving to Washington.343 Contradicting the Roosevelt 
administration on a key aspect of the New Deal agenda would not 
have played well with the party faithful. Only Frankfurter was im-
mune to the siren song of political ambition; his Austrian birth 
meant he could never attain the top rung of political life. 
This combination of executive branch experience, trial by fire 
during the Court-packing battle, political advising, and political 
ambition produced Justices who were of one mind with the Presi-
dent on the central question of government control over the econ-
omy. Roosevelt's appointments ensured that the Supreme Court 
would not be an obstacle to government control over finance. 
B. The Ephemeral Leaders as to Securities Law 
The New Deal Court established a pattern of deference to the 
SEC in securities cases despite the absence of a strong leader on 
the Court. The two most obvious candidates for that role were 
Douglas and Frankfurter, professors from Yale and Harvard re-
spectively. Both had already developed fairly complete views of 
administrative and commercial law prior to their judicial appoint-
ments. Frankfurter was a leading theorist of the administrative 
state and Douglas was a rising star in bankruptcy and securities 
law. Their pre-Court correspondence reflects mutual admiration, 
suggesting they might have formed a powerful coalition in securi-
ties law. The reality was far different, however, with neither Justice 
playing an important role. 
1. Douglas 
Douglas's is the murkier of the two cases. His academic interests 
were much more focused than Frankfurter's and he had active ad-
ministrative experience with the SEC. The latter provides the most 
ready explanation for his lack of influence: his consistent recusals 
in securities cases. Having been chair of the SEC when the agency 
launched its enforcement of PUHCA, he did not sit on a PUHCA 
case for his first dozen years on the court, as the breakup of the 
utility holding companies dragged on and on. By the time he par-
343 Fine, supra note 226, at 133. 
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ticipated, the great battles of that front had been fought and won. 
Douglas did not write a PUHCA opinion until 1954, the tail end of 
the Court's PUHCA jurisprudence. He also recused himself from 
all securities cases for his first six years on the Court. In the first se-
curities case decided during his tenure, U.S. Realty, Douglas 
recused himself despite having no basis for disqualification, simply 
because of pressure from Chief Justice Hughes, who was wielding 
recusal as a strategic weapon. For other cases, the contact that 
could have created conflicts was very tangential. The notes in his 
files indicate that his secretary, Edith Waters, collected the infor-
mation on the ties of the case to the time that Douglas was at the 
Commission. In one case, the investigation had not started until 
three years after Douglas left the Commission, but the mere men-
tion of a possible earlier investigation at the staff level was suffi-
cient to trigger recusal even though it had never reached the com-
missioners.344 In the Joiner case heard in 1943, the case had only 
been opened quite recently, but mention of an earlier informal 
staff investigation that was closed in February 1936 (Douglas had 
become a commissioner on January 23) was enough to provoke 
recusal. 345 
Douglas left little guidance on his recusal policy, other than to 
say it was up to each Justice.346 Perhaps Douglas's political ambition 
made him acutely sensitive to any potential charge of conflict of in-
terest. Rutledge worried that Douglas's recusals were depriving the 
court of expertise.347 Yet, his nonparticipation in securities cases 
does not appear to have affected their outcomes; the available evi-
dence suggests that Douglas would have joined in the broad defer-
ence given to the SEC. Even after he ceased recusing himself, 
Douglas was not an active participant in securities cases, not writ-
344 Memorandum from Edith Walters (e.w.) for the A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur 
d'Alene's Mines Corp. conference (Dec. 21, 1940) (on file with the William 0. Doug-
las Papers, Library of Congress) (noting no official action by the SEC until April 
1940, which was after Douglas had left the agency). The memo notes that the regional 
office looked into some shareholder complaints between May and August 1937 and 
that the agency's general counsel decided it was not a matter for action by the Com-
mission and was never taken to a Commission meeting. 
34~ Memorandum from Edith Walters (e.w.) for the SEC v. CM. Joiner & Co. con-
ference (Oct. 15, 1943) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Papers, Library of Con-
gress) (reporting information gathered from Orval duBois). 
346 William 0. Douglas, The Court Years: 1939-1975, at 31 (1980). 
347 Ferren, supra note 91, at 282. 
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ing an opinion until Penfield in 1947. Indeed, most of his securities 
opinions show up in the last four years of his tenure, most notably 
his short but wide-ranging opinion for the Court in Bankers Life, 
the apogee of the reach of Rule lOb-5 as a regulator of securities 
transactions.348 Bankers Life is remarkable for its opacity; even less 
significant are a string of dissents Douglas wrote in the 1970s after 
the Court's majority had taken a more restrictive turn in securities 
law. The bottom line is that Douglas had little impact on the 
Court's securities jurisprudence for his entire career. 
His abandonment of securities is all the more peculiar in light of 
his very active role in other areas of private law, where he played 
the leadership role that one would have been expected given his 
background and talent. In bankruptcy, for example, he was a 
leader on the Court from his first term. He was instrumental in get-
ting Los Angeles Lumber349 heard by the Court: 
The CJ has a "special list" for certioraris. Those which he thinks 
are not even worthy of discussion in conference are placed by 
him on the "special list." He circulates the "special list" a day or 
so before conference. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 
was on his "special list." I wrote him that I wanted it discussed. 
So he discussed it and firmly recommended that the petition be 
denied. Before conference I had planted some seeds of doubt in 
the minds of the Brethern [sic]. As a result we got 4 votes neces-
sary for a grant. The CJ. seemed quite upset. I later learned that 
this was the first time in the C.J.'s regime when a case had been 
removed from his "special list.''350 
Not only did Douglas succeed in getting the case heard over 
Hughes' opposition, he prevailed in conference as well.351 Douglas 
congratulated himself in his diary when the decision came down: 
"The ipinion [sic] should have a healthy effect and curb the reor-
348 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
349 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1939) (inter-
preting "fair and equitable" in the bankruptcy act). 
350 William 0. Douglas, Diary (Oct. 18, 1939) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780). 
351 William 0. Douglas, Diary (Oct. 21, 1939) (on file with the William 0. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780) ("The CJ was bent on affirming the judg-
ment below in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. He had McR and Reed with 
him. Stone assigned the opinion to me."). 
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ganization racketeers-the holding companies and the investment 
bankers who want to keep their preserves inviolate and under their 
control."352 Douglas again pushed bankruptcy onto the Court's 
agenda later that term in Pepper v. Litton,353 getting that case re-
moved from the Chief Justice's "special list."354 
Douglas's lack of influence in securities cases may also reflect 
more general personality characteristics and his inability to get 
along well with colleagues. Cavalier work habits, colleagues' re-
sentment of his political ambitions, and even the fallout from his 
divorce seemed to isolate him from his colleagues, despite early 
shared experiences.355 Alternatively, the pattern of nonparticipation 
suggests that Douglas was finished with securities law.356 His auto-
biography does not mention even a single securities case for his en-
tire time on the court.357 Perhaps the field had done all it could for 
him in terms of getting him to the SEC, and from there to the 
Court. Perhaps the large issues of the role of the government in the 
economy had been resolved and he now wanted to make his mark 
on the public stage in areas like civil liberties. Douglas's remaining 
ambitions in corporate law-federal incorporation and socialized 
investment banking-could be achieved only through legislative, 
not judicial, action. 
352 William 0. Douglas, Diary (Nov. 4, 1939) (on file with the William O. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780). 
353 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
354 William 0. Douglas, Diary (Nov. 9, 1939) (on file with the William O. Douglas 
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780) ("This case had been on the C.J.'s 'special 
list.' I was responsible for taking it off. He was against it since it involved only a fac-
tual question, not an 'important principle.' I thought otherwise and carried the 
Court."). 
355 See, e.g., James F. Simon, Independent Journey: The Life of William 0. Douglas 
201-02 {1980) {describing a small group that gathered to celebrate Frankfurter's ap-
pointment to the court that included Douglas, Jackson, Murphy, and Harry Hopkins 
in Harold Ickes' office at the Department of the Interior). 
356 See Murphy, supra note 127, at 351. Walter Dellinger, then a clerk to Black (and 
later Acting Solicitor General in the Clinton administration), asked Douglas in 1968 if 
he would go on the Court if he had to do it over again. Douglas replied, "Absolutely 
not!" He explained that "the Court as an institution is too peripheral, too much in the 
backwater on the Court. You 're just too far out of the action here." Id. 
357 See Douglas, supra note 346, at 417-21 ("Index of Supreme Court Cases in This 
Volume."). 
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2. Frankfurter 
If Douglas was not going to assume a leadership role in the field 
of securities laws, why did Frankfurter not take the lead? Frank-
furter was not inclined to defer to the expertise of the SEC, given 
his role in the enactment of the agency's key statutes. Frankfurter 
certainly expected to be a leader on the New Deal Court and out-
side observers expected it as well.358 Moreover, Frankfurter 
"yearn[ed] for disciples,"359 and he was unceasing in his efforts to 
bring his colleagues into line with his own well-developed views of 
the law.360 This may, however, be the key to Frankfurter's lack of 
influence: his efforts to persuade tended to alienate.361 
Frankfurter had two weaknesses in this regard. The first was his 
tendency to view those who disagreed with him as wanting either in 
intelligence or morals. Frankfurter and Reed were close allies from 
Reed's time as Solicitor General,362 but that relationship frayed 
when they became colleagues on the Court. Reed told his clerks: 
"the trouble with Felix is that he never considers that he might be 
358 Hirsch, supra note 17, at 141 ("It was inevitable that Frankfurter in 1939 would 
think of himself as the intellectual leader of the Roosevelt Court. Members of the 
White House circle expected him to dominate; that was why he had been appointed. 
He expected himself to dominate."); Lash, supra note 29, at 64 ('"If you appoint 
Felix,' Ickes said to Roosevelt, 'his ability and learning are such that he will dominate 
the Supreme Court for fifteen or twenty years to come. The result will be that proba-
bl~ after you are dead, it will still be your Supreme Court."). 
59 Lash, supra note 29, at 75 ("Frankfurter had come on the Court expecting that in 
time he would become its intellectual leader and that the authority he exercised in his 
seminar at Harvard would be replicated in the conferences of the Brethren. He had a 
yearning for disciples."). 
360 Hirsch, supra note 17, at 209 ("Although he, perhaps more than anyone, lobbied 
other members of the Court for votes, he never admitted doing so, but rather per-
ceived his own actions as helpfully 'advising' his brethren; his judicial opponents, 
however, were, in his view, cynical and evil spreaders of their own influence."). 
361 See Eugene Gressman, Psycho-Enigmatizing Felix Frankfurter, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 
731, 739 (1982) (reviewing Hirsch, supra note 17) ("Neither I nor Murphy could dis-
cover what Frankfurter hoped to accomplish with this endless chain of condescending 
admonishments .... If the notes were really designed to reform or change Murphy's 
ideological commitments, they were futile. If they were designed to change a Murphy 
vote or position in a given case, they utterly failed. But if they were written to annoy, 
insult, or display Frankfurter's 'personalia' techniques, perhaps they hit their mark."). 
362 See Schlesinger, supra note 99, at 228-29 ("Stanley Reed became the particular 
protector of the Harvard Law School crowd. RFC and, after Reed became Solicitor 
General in 1935, Justice served as the intelligence switchboard and the operational 
base for the web of Frankfurter-Corcoran relationships through the new agencies."). 
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wrong: if you don't agree with Felix, you must be either stupid or 
dishonest!"363 Moreover, Frankfurter's self-righteous streak could 
lead him to be abusive toward his colleagues. According to Doug-
las, 
Frankfurter also indulged in histrionics in Conference. He often 
came in with piles of books, and on his turn to talk, would pound 
the table, read from the books, throw them around and create a 
great disturbance. His purpose was never aimless. His act was de-
signed to get a particular Justice's vote or at least create doubts 
in the mind of a Justice who was thinking the other way. At 
times, when another was talking, he would break in, make a deri-
sive comment and shout down the speaker.364 
Douglas was hardly an impartial observer, given the deep-seated 
antipathy that developed between the two, but his views were 
shared by other colleagues as well.365 
Frankfurter was also hampered in his efforts to persuade by his 
low opinion of a number of his colleagues, which he had difficulty 
hiding. Chief Justice Vinson is one example. Edward Prichard, a 
Vinson protege who served as Frankfurter's law clerk, said that 
Frankfurter "did not have high regard for Vinson's judicial capa-
bilities and ... was not very adept at concealing his views on things 
of that sort."366 Vinson, ordinarily an easy-going personality,367 once 
had to be blocked from striking Frankfurter in conference.368 
Frankfurter's contempt for what he perceived as Black and Doug-
las's political maneuvering is well known. Other Justices also felt 
363 Quoted in Fassett, supra note 140, at 584. See also Hirsch, supra note 17, at 190 
("Frankfurter measured every colleague by his alignment with what he regarded as 
the ultimate split within the Court-between his 'disinterested' and scholarly belief in 
judicial self-restraint, and the 'shoddy,' 'result-oriented,' 'demogogic' jurisprudence of 
his opponents."). 
364 Douglas, supra note 346, at 22. 
365 Howard, Jr., supra note 334, at 269 ("Justice Murphy in turn came to regard Jus-
tice Frankfurter's professorial habits as tiresome and tangential. The former law pro-
fessor's campaigns for 'self-restraint' and 'law as the embodiment of reason,' he found 
hard not to dismiss as masks for the same use of personal convictions that Frankfurter 
so readily condemned in others."). 
366 St. Clair & Gugin, supra note 273, at 174. 
367 Id. ("Although Vinson was an affable man by nature, 'he could take offense if he 
were affronted and Frankfurter was a good affronter."'). 
368 Murphy, supra note 127, at 301. 
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the sting of Frankfurter's contempt.369 Within a few years of his ap-
pointment to the Court, Frankfurter's heavy-handed manner had 
left him with close connections to only Jackson and Roberts. 
The result of Frankfurter's alienation of his colleagues was that 
his message did not find a very receptive audience. He presented 
his colleagues with a stark choice-defer to the SEC or defer to 
him. For Frankfurter's New Deal colleagues, it was easier to love 
the SEC. As a result, Frankfurter's core message-the importance 
of adherence to the rule of law by the administrative state-did not 
draw any consistent followers. Frankfurter ended up dissenting ten 
times in securities cases during this period, more than any other 
Justice. Perhaps even more telling, however, is the fact that his 
small dissenting bloc was continually shifting, suggesting that 
Frankfurter was not delivering a consistent message. 
3. Into the Void 
In the absence of Douglas or Frankfurter, there was a wide dis-
persal of influences over the Court's securities docket. In PUHCA 
cases, with Douglas, Reed, Jackson, and sometimes Stone recused, 
the decision-writing fell to Murphy, or more accurately, to his 
clerk. Murphy did not have any particular interest in the area; he 
wrote a substantial number of opinions in the area simply because 
that was what he was assigned.370 Murphy's prior exposure to public 
utilities was quite limited.371 Murphy's lack of experience was in 
369 Ferren, supra note 91, at 277 (describing how Frankfurter harangued Reed to his 
face and made fun of him behind his back, calling him a "vegetable"); Howard, Jr., 
supra note 334, at 268 ("Justice Murphy enjoyed Frankfurter's wit and acknowledged 
his superior intellect. Yet he felt defensive beside them .... Frankfurter was an excit-
able and scrappy intellectual who had ill-concealed contempt for the Irishman's intel-
lect and night life .... "); Fine, supra note 226, at 195 (Frankfurter had similarly low 
regard for Burton); Hirsch, supra note 17, at 182 (noting that Frankfurter wrote to 
Hand that "'Hugo is a self-righteous, self-deluded part fanatic, part demagogue, who 
really disbelieves in law, thinks it is essentially manipulation of language. Intrinsically, 
the best brain in the Jot, but undisciplined and 'functional' in its employment, an in-
strument for supporting a predetermined result, not a means for responsible in-
quiry"). 
370 Telephone Interview with Eugene Gressman, supra note 274. 
371 Murphy's pre-Court experience with public utilities was limited and unlikely to 
make him sympathetic to the industry. He had a run in with the utility companies 
while governor of Michigan. The private utility companies were engaged in "spite line 
construction," the practice of building power lines in areas that had been approved 
for rural electric cooperatives in an effort to maintain their monopolies. Sidney Fine, 
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sharp contrast to the rest of the Court, which included a professor 
who had brokered the key legislative compromise for the Act 
(Frankfurter) and a Senator who had chaired key legislative hear-
ings (Black). Also on the Court, although recusing themselves in 
many of the PUHCA cases, were the SEC Chairman at the time 
the enforcement program was begun (Douglas), the Solicitor Gen-
eral who argued the first case (Reed), and the Assistant Attorney 
General who argued the second case before the Supreme Court 
(Jackson).372 The fact that Murphy wrote most frequently for the 
Court in this area might suggest that the Justices viewed the area as 
unimportant; Murphy's abilities were not well respected by his col-
leagues.373 
The dearth of interest in securities law also may have reflected a 
dearth of legislative and regulatory initiatives. Congress passed no 
significant securities legislation between 1940 and 1964. The SEC 
went from being an activist force under Douglas to being a back-
water after its wartime move to Philadelphia. (It was not returned 
from exile until 1948.) Private class actions, the development that 
fueled the Court's reactionary backlash of the 1970s in securities 
law, did not become a force until Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 was amended in 1966. Simply put, there was not much going on 
in securities law after the constitutionality of PUHCA was affirmed 
in North American. Douglas had made his national name as SEC 
Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years 445 (1979). In response, Murphy's administra-
tion prohibited the construction of new lines by the companies without prior ap-
proval. Id. 
m Even the Justices who had not played a role in the enactment and defense of 
PUHCA had some experience with corporations and utilities in their background. 
Rutledge was a professor of corporate law at Washington University and Iowa. See 
supra note 91 and accompanying text. Harold Burton, Truman's first appointee to the 
Court, also had extensive experience in corporate and public utilities law. He worked 
for a corporate law firm in Cleveland and served as general counsel of the Utah 
Power and Light Company and the Idaho Power Company. Mary Frances Berry, Sta-
bility, Security, and Continuity: Mr. Justice Burton and Decision-Making in the Su-
preme Court 1945-1958, at 4 (1978). He also "taught a corporation law course at the 
Western Reserve University Law School from 1923 through 1925." Id. at 5. When he 
returned to private practice in 1932, he "specialized in municipal law, sometimes rep-
resenting communities on utility and bond issues, and was associate counsel for the 
cit~ of Cleveland in its gas rate litigation." Id. at 6. 
3 3 Howard, Jr., supra note 334, at 411 ("Nearly all of [Murphy's] colleagues, at one 
time or another, had to remind him that the Court's job was not to pronounce on the 
reasons for policy, but merely to review power to make it."). 
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Chairman a decade earlier, and Frankfurter had cemented his fu-
ture nomination to the Court by acting as Roosevelt's advisor in 
enacting the securities laws, but it was not an area to establish a 
reputation as a Justice. 
CONCLUSION 
A lynchpin of Franklin Roosevelt's political revolution was gov-
ernmental control over finance, reflecting a nascent trust in admin-
istrative experts to make the crucial decisions organizing economic 
behavior. Securities regulation was at the heart of this change in 
the role of government in the 1930s. Success for this administration 
required not just enactment of new laws by Congress, but also an 
effective strategy to get these new laws past the Supreme Court. 
Ultimately for FDR this meant appointing Justices who believed in 
the new role of government in the economy. The eight men Roo-
sevelt appointed to the Court did not disappoint. Other Presidents 
have sought to make over the Supreme Court for particular politi-
cal goals with variable success; Roosevelt unambiguously suc-
ceeded in achieving his goal, at least in the field of securities laws. 
A likely explanation for this success was that all eight of the New 
Deal Justices had front line experience in the earlier stages of the 
enactment and defense of the New Deal securities laws. Indeed, 
securities law formed something of a common link for the future 
Roosevelt appointees. Such a bonding experience may better pre-
dict judicial outlook than opinions written as an appellate court 
judge, more recently relied upon to handicap judicial appoint-
ments. The course for securities law set by these eight Justices con-
tinued almost unbroken for forty years. 
The two Justices with the most direct securities experience, how-
ever, turned out to have played rather minor roles in the Court's 
securities law jurisprudence. Felix Frankfurter oversaw the drafting 
of the 1933 Act, brokered the key compromise for PUHCA and 
advised the new administration on litigation strategy, but he 
squandered any leadership role with an attitude toward colleagues 
that made it difficult for anyone to follow. But as a dissenter, 
Frankfurter did frame the point at which the New Deal alliance 
frayed, arguing for judicial control of the SEC. That debate would 
926 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:841 
reappear with the efforts of Lewis Powell to rein in the SEC's fight 
against insider trading,374 and it continues to this day. William 0. 
Douglas drove the SEC expansion into bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions, brought the New York Stock Exchange to heel, and oversaw 
the agency's aggressive role in public utility holding company legis-
lation. Notwithstanding these achievements in the field, Douglas 
seemingly lost all interest in securities law upon his appointment to 
the Court. 
The abdication of these leading figures, did not affect the ulti-
mate outcomes, however, as Roosevelt's other appointees did not 
require forceful leadership; they were already bonded to the cause 
from their political (Black and Byrnes) and advocacy (Reed, Jack-
son, and Murphy) roles. As a Court, they were committed to gov-
ernmental control over finance. The result was generous deference 
to the SEC, a judicial attitude that would last until the 1970s. 
374 Pritchard, supra note 238, at 15. 
